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1851 
PUT PRIVITY IN THE PAST:  
A MODERN APPROACH FOR DETERMINING WHEN 
WASHINGTON ATTORNEYS ARE LIABLE TO NONCLIENTS 
FOR ESTATE PLANNING MALPRACTICE 
Kaitlyn C. Kelly* 
Abstract: Even in the best of circumstances, an estate plan may leave intended 
beneficiaries frustrated. Occasionally, an attorney’s alleged mistake in the execution of a will 
or administration of a trust sparks the beneficiaries’ anger. Under Washington law, it is 
unclear whether intended beneficiaries may sue an estate planning attorney for malpractice. 
Generally, an estate planning attorney’s client is a testator, not a testator’s intended 
beneficiaries; thus, the intended beneficiaries are not in privity of contract with the attorney. 
Rather, the only individual in privity with the accused attorney is usually deceased at the time 
of a malpractice lawsuit. If a strict privity rule applies, courts will leave beneficiaries with 
few options to hold attorneys accountable for costly mistakes in the drafting or execution of 
estate planning documents. On the other hand, courts will expand the scope of liability too 
far if they allow any nonclient to sue an estate planning attorney for malpractice. 
First, this Comment traces trends in Washington estate planning malpractice law. The 
discussion begins with two Washington State Supreme Court decisions that suggest a 
balancing test, rather than a strict privity rule, defines the scope of attorney malpractice 
liability to nonclients. Then it analyzes two Washington State court of appeals cases that 
demonstrate how the balancing test still favors privity in its application. Second, this 
Comment weighs the strengths and weaknesses of other jurisdictions’ approaches to attorney 
malpractice liability to nonclients. Third, it considers different scenarios in which courts may 
hold an estate planning attorney liable to nonclients under Washington law. Finally, this 
Comment recommends that courts require nonclient intended beneficiaries to exhaust 
Washington’s will and trust reformation statute before bringing a claim against an estate 
planning attorney. 
INTRODUCTION 
Washington courts need clarity when determining whether an 
intended beneficiary has standing to bring a malpractice action against 
an estate planning attorney. While the Washington State Supreme Court 
adopted a balancing test to address this issue,1 recent Washington State 
court of appeals decisions suggest that a privity requirement remains in 
                                                     
* Thank you to Professor Karen Boxx for her thoughtful guidance and to the Washington Law 
Review staff for their editing assistance. 
1. Trask v. Butler, 123 Wash. 2d 835, 842–43, 872 P.2d 1080, 1084 (1994). This Comment refers 
to Washington’s balancing test as “the Trask balancing test.”  
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certain circumstances.2 The appellate decisions did not substantially 
change Washington law because the facts of each case addressed a 
narrow issue.3 The balancing test requires a case-by-case fact analysis, 
but with Washington courts seeing little variation in the facts that have 
come before them, they have not been able to develop case law applying 
the test’s factors to the larger range of possible facts they might face in 
the future. 
This Comment considers fact patterns in which Washington’s 
balancing test4 may support a cause of action for a plaintiff who is not 
the defendant-attorney’s client (a “nonclient”).5 It recommends using 
Washington’s will and trust reformation statute as an exhaustion 
requirement before intended beneficiaries may bring malpractice actions 
against estate planning attorneys.6 This solution attempts to provide 
attorney accountability without extending attorney liability too far. 
Consider an individual who obtained an attorney and created an estate 
plan. An intended beneficiary later discovers the attorney acted 
negligently. Maybe the attorney failed to have witnesses attest to the 
signatures on the will, wrote incorrect names in the will, or did not draft 
a will at all. Without a valid estate plan in place, the intended beneficiary 
does not receive her intended gift. She wants to hold the attorney 
accountable for the mistake, so she files a malpractice lawsuit against the 
attorney in a Washington court. However, the court dismisses her claim 
because it finds that intended beneficiaries have no standing to bring 
such a claim. In many circumstances, Washington courts would leave 
intended beneficiaries in exactly this type of confusing, infuriating 
situation. 
The above hypothetical raises a few potential estate planning errors, 
but it is not exclusive. Possible claims against estate planning attorneys 
include error in document execution; failure to adhere to a testator’s 
goals or intent; error of law; failure to make necessary revisions to an 
estate plan when circumstances change; failure to properly investigate a 
testator’s heirs or assets; failure to advise the testator on tax 
consequences or disclaimer options; breach of contract to draft an estate 
planning document; negligent planning that increases taxes; error in 
document drafting; execution of documents when the testator lacks 
                                                     
2. See generally Linth v. Gay, 190 Wash. App. 331, 360 P.3d 844 (2015); Parks v. Fink, 173 
Wash. App. 366, 293 P.3d 1275 (2013).  
3. See Linth, 190 Wash. App. 331, 360 P.3d 844; Parks, 173 Wash. App. 366, 293 P.3d 1275.  
4. Trask, 123 Wash. 2d at 842–43, 872 P.2d at 1084.  
5. See infra Part IV.  
6. See infra Part V. 
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testamentary capacity; delay in implementing an estate plan; failure to 
limit legal representation to discrete issues; and failure to meet 
deadlines.7 With so much room for error, legal malpractice liability is a 
paramount concern for estate planning attorneys.8 
This Comment explores the scope of estate planning malpractice 
liability for attorneys in Washington and considers room for 
improvement from both attorneys’ and nonclients’ perspectives. Part I 
discusses Washington legal malpractice law. Part II analyzes the 
development of Washington estate planning legal malpractice case law, 
identifying the shift from a balancing test to an apparent requirement of 
privity between the nonclient-plaintiff and attorney-defendant. The 
discussion begins with Washington State Supreme Court cases 
Stangland v. Brock9 and Trask v. Butler.10 Next, this Comment discusses 
Washington court of appeals decisions Parks v. Fink11 and Linth v. 
Gay12 and analyzes where Washington law stands after the Linth 
decision. On one hand, the decision suggests that the Washington State 
courts of appeal returned to a privity rule when deciding whether estate 
planning attorneys owe nonclients a duty of care.13 On the other hand, 
the Washington State courts of appeal likely intended to limit their 
decisions in Parks and Linth to the narrow factual settings of each: the 
failure to promptly execute a will and the failure to promptly execute a 
trust.14 
                                                     
7. Stephanie B. Casteel, Letitia A. McDonald, Jennifer D. Odom & Nicole J. Wade, The Modern 
Estate Planning Lawyer: Avoiding the Maelstrom of Malpractice Claims, 22 PROB. & PROP. 48 
(Nov.–Dec. 2008). 
8. George King, Legal Malpractice—Estate, Will, and Succession Matters, in 24 AM. JUR. PROOF 
OF FACTS 584–85 (2d ed. 1980) (“The expansion of estate practice into highly complex areas, 
coupled with the increasingly prevalent use of paralegals and other personnel in estate planning and 
probate work, have made counsel practicing in this field increasingly subject to negligence suits. As 
has been noted: ‘Recent studies and experience indicate that malpractice exposure is substantially 
higher in the areas of estate planning and estate administration than in general. The increase in 
availability and quality of legal education materials, especially in the tax field, together with the 
relatively clear ground rules for the administration of decedents’ estates narrow the margin for 
error.’” (quoting James R. Wade, How to Avoid Probate Malpractice: A Probate Judge Offers Tips 
on Sidestepping Trouble in Estate Planning and Administration; Filing Delays Can Frequently 
Lead to Lawsuits, 2 NAT’L L.J. 17 (July 7, 1980))).  
9. 109 Wash. 2d 675, 747 P.2d 464 (1987). 
10. 123 Wash. 2d 835, 872 P.2d 1080 (1994). 
11. 173 Wash. App. 366, 293 P.3d 1275 (2013). 
12. 190 Wash. App. 331, 360 P.3d 844 (2015).  
13. See infra section II.D 
14. See infra sections II.C and II.D; Linth, 190 Wash. App. at 334–35, 360 P.3d at 846–47; Parks, 
173 Wash. App. at 368–73, 293 P.3d at 1276–79. 
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Part III studies the strengths and weaknesses of other jurisdictions’ 
approaches to attorney liability in estate planning malpractice lawsuits. 
If presented with an opportunity to revisit the issue, Washington courts 
may look to other jurisdictions for guidance. Few states adhere to a strict 
privity rule.15 Most jurisdictions recognize an exception to the privity 
rule based on a balancing test, a third party beneficiary contract theory, 
or a foreseeability of harm tort theory.16 Some states in the majority 
group limit the exception by only recognizing causes of action for 
intended beneficiaries expressly named in estate planning documents.17 
Part IV considers potential facts in which the Trask balancing test 
may dictate a different result than in the Parks and Linth decisions.18 
Lower courts may appreciate this review of alternative facts because 
Parks and Linth both involved the narrow issue of prompt execution.19 
Part V recommends that nonclient intended beneficiaries who wish to 
bring malpractice actions against estate planning attorneys must first 
exhaust their remedies under Washington’s will and trust reformation 
statute.20 If intended beneficiaries prove by “clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence” that an estate planning document does not reflect 
the testator’s intentions, then a court may reform the document.21 
Therefore, courts have the power to make frustrated intended 
beneficiaries whole under the reformation statute without a malpractice 
action. Additionally, courts may hold estate planning attorneys 
accountable under the statute by imposing attorneys’ fees on the 
attorneys allegedly at fault.22 This solution strikes a balance between 
holding Washington attorneys to a high ethical standard and making 
intended beneficiaries whole, while limiting the reach of potential 
attorney malpractice liability. 
                                                     
15. See infra section III.A. 
16. See infra section III.B. 
17. See infra section III.B.  
18. See infra Part IV. 
19. See generally Linth, 190 Wash. App. 331, 360 P.3d 844 (discussing an attorney’s alleged 
failure to promptly execute trust documents); Parks, 173 Wash. App. 366, 293 P.3d 1275 
(discussing an attorney’s alleged failure to promptly execute a will).  
20. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.125 (2016). 
21. Id. 
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.150 (2016). 
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I. WASHINGTON LEGAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY:  
AN OVERVIEW 
Legal malpractice is defined as “[a] lawyer’s failure to render 
professional services with the skill, prudence, and diligence that an 
ordinary and reasonable lawyer would use under similar 
circumstances.”23 Claims of legal malpractice arise out of many different 
situations and are based on three different legal theories: negligence, 
breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract.24 Under the now-
disfavored25 common law approach, attorneys did not owe a duty of care 
to third parties.26 Therefore, such individuals did not have a cause of 
action against attorneys who allegedly harmed them.27 However, the 
modern trend is for courts to extend malpractice causes of action to 
nonclients under limited circumstances.28 Public policy considerations, 
the third party beneficiary doctrine in contract law, and tort theories 
support this modern trend.29 
To establish a malpractice claim in Washington, a plaintiff has the 
burden of establishing four elements: (1) the existence of an attorney-
client relationship in which the attorney owes the client a duty of care; 
“(2) an act or omission by the attorney in breach of the duty of care; (3) 
damage to the client; and (4) proximate causation between the attorney’s 
breach of the duty and the damage incurred.”30 This Comment focuses 
on the first element, the attorney-client relationship, because that 
element generally requires privity of contract between the defendant and 
the plaintiff. However, a plaintiff may sometimes establish the first 
                                                     
23. Legal Malpractice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
24. See, e.g., Bowman v. Two, 104 Wash. 2d 181, 187, 704 P.2d 140, 143 (1985) (“Washington 
allows an action for legal malpractice to be framed either as a tort or a breach of contract.”); 
Shoemake v. Ferrer, 143 Wash. App. 819, 830–32, 182 P.3d 992, 998–99 (2008) (plaintiffs’ legal 
malpractice claim was based on an attorney’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty); Kelly v. Foster, 62 
Wash. App. 150, 154, 813 P.2d 598, 600 (1991) (“Like many [legal malpractice] cases, the basis of 
liability was a claimed breach of fiduciary duty.”). 
25. See infra section III.B (discussing the modern majority approach). 
26. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200, 205–06 (1879). 
27. Id.  
28. Stangland v. Brock, 109 Wash. 2d 675, 680, 747 P.2d 464, 467 (1987) (citing Bowman, 104 
Wash. 2d at 186–87, 704 P.2d at 142).  
29. David K. DeWolf & Keller W. Allen, Attorney Malpractice—Duty to Nonclients, in 16 
WASHINGTON PRACTICE, TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 719–22 (4th ed. 2015); see also infra section 
III.B.  
30. Schmidt v. Coogan, 181 Wash. 2d 661, 665, 335 P.3d 424, 427–28 (2014); Hizey v. 
Carpenter, 119 Wash. 2d 251, 260–61, 830 P.2d 646, 651 (1992).  
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element without a showing of privity.31 Even if a nonclient meets the 
first element without privity, a court may still dismiss the action if it 
finds that the attorney-defendant met the appropriate standard of care.32 
In Washington, attorneys meet the required standard of care by 
exercising “the degree of care, skill, diligence, and knowledge 
commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful, and prudent 
lawyer in the practice of law.”33 Regardless of practice area, attorneys 
must uphold this standard of care.34 While the standard of care is high, it 
is not so high as to include “mere error[s] in judgment . . . if acting in 
good faith and in an honest belief that those acts and advice are well-
founded.”35 A poor legal outcome alone does not show that an attorney 
failed to meet his or her standard of care.36 However, the duty does 
require attorneys to exercise reasonable and diligent care in following 
the client’s instructions.37 
The duty of care owed to a client by an attorney is a question of law 
for the court.38 Disputes about whether two parties had an attorney-client 
relationship are questions of fact for a jury.39 The jury instruction on the 
issue of duty to nonclients explains that the nonclient-plaintiff has the 
burden of proving that the attorney-defendant and the testator-client 
intended to establish a relationship for the nonclient-plaintiff’s benefit.40 
The instruction’s comments explain that courts rarely use the instruction 
because judges generally determine duty to nonclients as a matter of law 
in pretrial motions based on a balancing of factors, known as the Trask 
factors.41 Because some of the Trask factors are legal questions for a 
                                                     
31. See DeWolf & Allen, supra note 29.  
32. Stangland, 109 Wash. 2d at 682–83, 747 P.2d at 468. 
33. Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 261, 830 P.2d at 652. 
34. Karl B. Tegland, Standard of Care and Malpractice, in 15 WASHINGTON PRACTICE, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 421–22 (2d ed. 2016). 
35. See id. 
36. WASH. STATE SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, LEGAL MALPRACTICE—
NEGLIGENCE—STANDARD OF CARE, 6 WASH. PRACTICE, WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTION CIVIL WPI 107.04 (6th ed. 2013).  
37. See Tegland, supra note 34, at 422.  
38. Parks v. Fink, 173 Wash. App. 366, 377, 293 P.3d 1275, 1280 (2013) (citing Folsom v. 
Burger King, 135 Wash. 2d 658, 671, 958 P.2d 301, 308 (1998)).  
39. Stiley v. Block, 130 Wash. 2d 486, 501–02, 925 P.2d 194, 202 (1996); Bohn v. Cody, 119 
Wash. 2d 357, 363–64, 832 P.2d 71, 74–75 (1992). 
40. See WASH. STATE SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DUTY TO NON-CLIENT, 
6 WASH. PRAC., WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTR. CIV. WPI 107.02 (6th ed. 2013). 
41. See WASH. STATE SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 40, Note on 
Use.  
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judge to decide, courts should not give the Trask factors to the jury.42 
Instead, the jury instruction should only relate to disputed issues of 
material fact regarding one or more of the Trask factors.43 
Like attorneys in all fields, estate planning attorneys may face 
malpractice liability for mistakes. Due to the technical nature of estate 
planning and the variety of knowledge required, attorneys in this area are 
particularly susceptible to malpractice liability.44 The emotions and 
financial stability of intended beneficiaries adds concern: 
Heirs or beneficiaries who feel that they have not received that 
to which they are entitled, or who are financially disappointed, 
are psychologically hurt and are often dealing with deep-seated 
family issues that were not dealt with before the decedent’s 
death. This anger and frustration can finally be vented in a 
lawsuit against the family’s advisors.45 
In some estate planning malpractice cases outside of Washington 
State, courts have held that intended beneficiaries may sue an attorney 
for malpractice even though the attorney and individual are not in privity 
of contract.46 Under different circumstances, courts have held that 
intended beneficiaries may not sue estate planning attorneys for 
malpractice.47 Washington courts have yet to hold an estate planning 
                                                     
42. See WASH. STATE SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 40, 
Comments; DeWolf & Allen, supra note 29, at 720 (“The question of whether or not a duty is owed 
is a question of law for the court.”). 
43. See WASH. STATE SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 40, 
Comments. 
44. Casteel et al., supra note 7, at 49.  
45. Id.  
46. WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, SHELDON F. KURTZ & DAVID M. ENGLISH, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
ESTATES INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS, 530, 617–18 (4th ed. 2010); see, e.g., 
Charleson v. Hardesty, 839 P.2d 1303, 1306–07 (Nev. 1992) (holding that attorneys who represent 
trustees in their trustee capacity owe a duty of care toward the trust’s beneficiaries as a matter of 
law); Elam v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 541 N.E.2d 616, 618 (Ohio 1989) (holding that nonclients had 
standing to sue the attorney because the nonclients had vested interests in the estate and were in 
privity with the attorney once their interests vested); see generally Estate of Agnew v. Ross, 110 A.3d 
1020 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (holding that nonclient intended beneficiaries of will and trust amendment 
had standing to sue the drafting attorney when the attorney failed to present the documents to the testator 
before death, the attorney admitted his mistake, and he was aware that the nonclients would benefit from 
the documents’ execution).  
47. See, e.g., Neal v. Baker, 551 N.E.2d 704, 706 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that a nonclient 
intended beneficiary was unable to sue the estate executor’s attorney for legal malpractice because 
the attorney was not hired by the executor with the intent to directly benefit the beneficiary); 
Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 576–78 (Tex. 1996) (holding that an estate planning attorney 
was not liable to nonclient for malpractice and did not have a duty to foresee that his client’s 
grandchildren would be harmed from the trust’s invalidity).  
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attorney liable to nonclients for malpractice liability. However, under 
certain circumstances, Washington courts may reach a different result. 
II. WASHINGTON’S ESTATE PLANNING MALPRACTICE 
CASE LAW: THE SHIFT FROM PRIVITY TO POSSIBLE 
ATTORNEY LIABILITY 
This section analyzes four seminal cases in Washington’s estate 
planning legal malpractice law: Stangland v. Brock, Trask v. Butler, 
Parks v. Fink, and Linth v. Gay. Each of these cases involves estate 
planning attorney-defendants and frustrated intended beneficiary 
plaintiffs.48 The cases set forth the general rule of legal malpractice: only 
an attorney’s clients have standing to sue her for malpractice.49 
Nevertheless, the cases recognize an exception to that general rule under 
tort and contract theories articulated in Stangland and a balancing test 
further defined in Trask (“the Trask balancing test”).50 However, the 
modern decisions of Parks and Linth suggest that privity is a de facto 
requirement under the Trask balancing test51 despite the Stangland and 
Trask Courts’ intentions to allow certain nonclients a cause of action.52 
A. The Stangland Court Relaxed the Privity Requirement and 
Introduced a New Theory that Supports Nonclients’ Potential 
Standing in Legal Malpractice Actions 
The Stangland v. Brock plaintiffs, Alvin Stangland and Bruce 
Kintschi, brought malpractice claims against two attorneys, Norman 
Brock and Kenneth Carpenter, and their law firm, Underwood, 
Campbell, Brock, & Cerutti, P.S.53 Mr. Stangland and Mr. Kintschi 
                                                     
48. Trask v. Butler, 123 Wash. 2d 835, 838–89, 872 P.2d 1080, 1082–83 (1994); Stangland v. 
Brock, 109 Wash. 2d 675, 677, 747 P.2d 464, 465 (1987); Linth v. Gay, 190 Wash. App. 331, 332–
35, 360 P.3d 844, 845–47 (2015); Parks v. Fink, 173 Wash. App. 366, 367–74, 293 P.3d 1275, 
1276–79 (2013).  
49. Trask, 123 Wash. 2d at 840, 872 P.2d at 1083; Stangland, 109 Wash. 2d at 679, 747 P.2d at 
467; Linth, 190 Wash. App. at 337, 360 P.3d at 847; Parks, 173 Wash. App. at 377, 293 P.3d at 
1280. 
50. Trask, 123 Wash. 2d at 841, 872 P.2d at 1083; Stangland, 109 Wash. 2d at 680–81, 747 P.2d 
at 467. 
51. See Linth, 190 Wash. App. at 341–42, 360 P.3d at 849–50; Parks, 173 Wash. App. at 377, 
386–87, 293 P.3d at 1281, 1285–86. 
52. Trask, 123 Wash. 2d at 843–44, 872 P.2d at 1084–85; Stangland, 109 Wash. 2d at 681, 747 
P.2d at 468.  
53. Stangland, 109 Wash. 2d at 676–77, 747 P.2d at 465. 
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claimed that the attorneys’ negligence wrongfully limited their intended 
inheritance.54 
The decedent, Ralph Schalock, hired Mr. Brock as his attorney to 
draft a will leaving real property to Mr. Stangland and Mr. Kintschi and 
the residue of his estate to two other individuals.55 When Mr. Brock 
wrote the will, Mr. Schalock owned a valuable farm, which was intended 
to be the real property devised to the plaintiffs. However, three years 
after Mr. Brock wrote the will, Mr. Schalock hired another attorney from 
the same firm, Mr. Carpenter, to prepare a real estate contract to sell his 
farm.56 After the sale, a farm no longer existed to fulfill the gift in the 
will. 
When Mr. Schalock passed away, Mr. Stangland and Mr. Kintschi 
sued the two attorneys and sought damages for the attorneys’ alleged 
negligence.57 They alleged that the attorneys were negligent by not 
fulfilling the decedent’s intent to convey the farm to them, not advising 
the decedent about how the real estate sale would change his estate plan, 
and disregarding the decedent’s testamentary intent.58 The attorney-
defendants responded with a motion to dismiss the complaint.59 The trial 
court granted the attorneys’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ negligence 
claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.60 
On appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court focused on whether 
the plaintiffs established that the attorneys owed them a duty of care and 
had in fact breached that duty of care.61 The Court wrote: 
Traditionally, privity of contract between the parties has been 
required as a basis for establishing a duty in a legal malpractice 
action. . . . However, . . . the modern trend is to relax the privity 
requirement, allowing legal malpractice actions to be brought by 
persons other than the clients of attorneys in some factual 
situations.62 
                                                     
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 677–78, 747 P.2d at 466. The two other individuals were Troy Rux and Joseph Kintschi. 
Id. at 678, 747 P.2d at 466. 
56. Id. at 678, 747 P.2d at 466. Mr. Schalock sold his farmland to Frank and Janet Titchenal. Id. 
57. Id. Before filing this lawsuit, the will was admitted to probate and the Stangland plaintiffs 
argued that they were entitled to the vendor’s interest in the sale of the farmland, while the residue 
beneficiaries argued that they were entitled to it instead. The parties ended up settling in that 
dispute. Id. 
58. Id.  
59. Id. at 679, 747 P.2d at 466. 
60. Id. The court of appeals certified the appeal to the Washington State Supreme Court. Id. 
61. Id. at 679–80, 747 P.2d at 467. 
62. Id. 
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Relying on a prior holding, the Court explained that an attorney might 
owe a duty to a nonclient under a multifactor balancing test or a third 
party beneficiary contract theory.63 
While the Court recognized that the attorneys in Stangland might 
have owed a duty of care to nonclients Mr. Stangland and Mr. Kintschi, 
it held that the attorneys met the required standard of care imposed by 
that potential duty.64 The standard of professional care mandates 
attorneys to act with “that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge 
commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent 
lawyer in the practice of law.”65 
Regarding the claims against Mr. Brock, the Court reasoned that 
holding him to the plaintiffs’ suggested duty “would be expanding the 
obligation of a lawyer who drafts a will beyond reasonable limits.”66 The 
Court did not expect Mr. Brock to foresee the future when drafting Mr. 
Schalock’s will.67 He did not have notice that Mr. Schalock would sell 
the farm and did not need to provide legal advice about how that future 
sale would change the estate plan because he could not reasonably 
predict that the future sale would happen.68 
Looking at the claims against Mr. Carpenter, the Court held that he 
did not have a duty to advise the decedent about how the sale of the 
farmland would affect the decedent’s estate plan.69 The Court reasoned 
that this would require Mr. Carpenter to know the decedent’s estate 
plan.70 Mr. Carpenter could not reasonably have such knowledge as it 
“would impose potentially staggering responsibilities on 
attorneys . . . and would markedly increase the cost of providing legal 
services.”71 
The Stangland case marks an important point in the development of 
estate planning malpractice liability, even though the Court found that 
the attorneys in Stangland did not breach a potential duty of care owed 
to the intended beneficiaries.72 The Court recognized the modern trend 
                                                     
63. Id. at 680–81, 747 P.2d at 467 (citing Bowman v. Two, 104 Wash. 2d 181, 188, 704 P.2d 140, 
143 (1985)). 
64. Id. at 682–83, 747 P.2d at 468.  
65. Id. (citing Walker v. Bangs, 92 Wash. 2d 854, 859, 601 P.2d 1279, 1282 (1979)).  
66. Id. at 684, 747 P.2d at 469.  
67. Id.  
68. Id.  
69. Id. at 685–86, 747 P.2d at 469–70.  
70. Id.  
71. Id. at 685, 747 P.2d at 469–70. 
72. Id. at 682–83, 747 P.2d at 468.  
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to relax the privity requirement for legal malpractice actions.73 Pointing 
to an earlier case, the Stangland Court saw that the trend was slowly 
surfacing under theories of third party beneficiary contract law and a 
multifactor balancing test.74 The Court recognized that attorneys might 
have a duty of care to nonclients—given the right facts.75 The setting in 
Stangland did not fit the mold, but the Court’s recognition of possible 
liability shows its willingness to expand the scope of estate planning 
malpractice liability. 
The Court did not suggest that strict privity won the day. Instead, it 
expressed concern about expanding the obligations of a lawyer too far.76 
These potentially expansive and nebulous obligations require the Court 
to define limits on lawyers’ obligations. Potential limits include 
foreseeability and the subject of attorney advice.77 Under the Stangland 
rationale, the attorney only had a duty to give adequate legal advice on 
the issue he was aware of—the will’s execution—not the issue of how a 
potential sale of real estate would change the estate plan.78 
The attorneys’ alleged breach of duty in Stangland was failure to give 
proper advice to a client, which in turn affected the intended 
beneficiaries.79 Attorneys cannot reasonably perform their duties to a 
client if the law requires them to be well-versed in areas outside the 
scope of the legal issue for which a client hired them.80 Just as the 
Stangland Court did not expect the estate planning attorney to advise his 
client about real estate legal issues, it did not expect the real estate 
attorney to advise his client about estate planning issues.81 
The Stangland Court’s analysis suggests that lower courts should 
apply a balancing test or third party beneficiary theory to similar cases in 
the future.82 Nevertheless, lower courts have placed the Court’s concerns 
                                                     
73. Id. at 680, 747 P.2d at 467.  
74. Id. (citing Bowman v. Two, 104 Wash. 2d 181, 186–87, 704 P.2d 140, 142–43 (1985)). 
75. Id. at 680–83, 747 P.2d at 467–68.  
76. Id. at 684, 747 P.2d at 469. 
77. Id. at 683–84, 747 P.2d at 469.  
78. Id. at 683–86, 747 P.2d at 468–70.  
79. Id. at 678, 747 P.2d at 466. 
80. Id. at 684, 747 P.2d at 469 (“When an individual retains an attorney to draft his will, the 
attorney’s obligation is to use the care, skill, diligence and knowledge that a reasonable, prudent 
lawyer would exercise in order to draft the will . . . . Once that duty is accomplished, the attorney 
has no continuing obligation to monitor the testator’s management of his property to ensure that the 
scheme originally established in the will is maintained.”).  
81. Id. at 684–86, 747 P.2d at 469–70. 
82. Id. at 681, 747 P.2d at 467.  
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about “staggering responsibilities on attorneys”83 above the Court’s 
recognition of the privity requirement’s decreased significance.84 The 
upcoming analysis of Washington court of appeals cases discusses this 
priority placement.85 
B. The Trask Court Extended Stangland’s Rejection of Privity by 
Establishing a Balancing Test to Determine Attorneys’ Duty of 
Care to Nonclients 
In Trask v. Butler, the Washington State Supreme Court held that an 
attorney hired by an estate’s personal representative did not owe a duty 
of care to an estate beneficiary.86 George Trask passed away, leaving 
two children, Laurel and Russell.87 As the appointed personal 
representative of her father’s estate, Laurel hired an attorney to represent 
her in a quiet title action for property that George quitclaimed to Russell 
without the signature of George’s wife.88 When George’s wife required 
medical care after his death, Laurel sold the family home to help with 
expenses and used the same attorney to assist her in that sale.89 After 
George’s wife also passed away, Russell filed a malpractice lawsuit 
against Laurel’s attorney, Richard Butler.90 Russell claimed that the 
advice to file a quiet title action for the quitclaimed property was 
negligent because it decreased the value of the land that was eventually 
sold for a bargain price.91 
The issue in Trask was whether Russell met the first element of a 
malpractice claim92 against Mr. Butler: “the existence of an attorney-
client relationship which gives rise to a duty of care to the plaintiff.”93 
As in Stangland, the Court noted that traditionally the only plaintiffs 
                                                     
83. Id. at 685, 747 P.2d at 467–70.  
84. Id. at 680, 747 P.2d at 467. See generally Linth v. Gay, 190 Wash. App. 331, 360 P.3d 844 
(2015); Parks v. Fink, 173 Wash. App. 366, 293 P.3d 1275 (2013).  
85. See infra sections II.C, II.D. 
86. 123 Wash. 2d 835, 845, 872 P.2d 1080, 1085 (1994). 
87. Id. at 837, 872 P.2d at 1081–82. Because some of the Trask parties share a surname, the 
author refers to the individuals by their first names to avoid confusion.  
88. Id. at 837–38, 872 P.2d at 1082. Laurel hired Richard Butler as her attorney. Id. at 838, 872 
P.2d at 1082. 
89. Id. at 838, 872 P.2d at 1082. In 1986, the homestead was sold to the Turkheimers for 
$275,000. Id. In 1988, the sale was later litigated and set aside. Id. at 839, 872 P.2d at 1082.  
90. Id. at 839, 872 P.2d at 1082.  
91. Id.  
92. Id. at 840, 872 P.2d at 1083.  
93. Id. at 839, 872 P.2d at 1083. 
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who may bring malpractice lawsuits are those that were clients of the 
attorney-defendant, stating: “[u]nder traditional privity of contract rules 
Butler does not owe Russell, a nonclient, a duty of care.”94 Again, like 
Stangland, the Court noted that courts relaxed the privity requirement 
and the first element may be met under a balancing test or third party 
beneficiary contract test without privity.95 
The Court further developed the legal theory under which a plaintiff 
could potentially meet the first element of a legal malpractice claim 
despite a lack of privity by combining the two leading approaches.96 In 
synthesizing the third party beneficiary contract law test with the 
multifactor balancing test, the Court reduced confusion and developed 
six clear factors (“the Trask factors”) to balance in determining whether 
an attorney owes a nonclient-plaintiff a duty of care.97 The Trask factors 
include the following: 
(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to benefit 
the plaintiff;  
(2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff;  
(3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury;  
(4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s 
conduct and the injury;  
(5) the policy of preventing future harm; and  
(6) the extent to which the profession would be unduly burdened 
by a finding of liability.98 
After applying the Trask balancing test, the Court found that Mr. 
Butler did not owe a duty of care to Russell.99 Still, the Trask factors are 
a significant development in Washington case law because they embody 
the trend in courts moving away from the privity requirement. 
In Trask, the Court could not reasonably impose liability on the 
attorney-defendant because the beneficiaries were incidental rather than 
intended, the estate heirs could sue the personal representative instead of 
the attorney, and an unresolvable conflict of interest existed.100 For these 
reasons, the Court held that the Trask factors favored the attorney who 
                                                     
94. Id. at 840, 872 P.2d at 1083.  
95. Id. at 840–44, 872 P.2d at 1083–85.  
96. Id. at 842–43, 872 P.2d at 1084.  
97. Id. at 843, 872 P.2d at 1084.  
98. Id.  
99. Id. at 845, 872 P.2d at 1085. 
100. Id.  
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was hired by the estate’s personal representative.101 It addressed 
foreseeability concerns because the beneficiaries were incidental rather 
than intended.102 The Court also considered the availability of other 
means of justice and the desire to avoid potential conflicts of interest.103 
It reasoned that there is “a risk of divided loyalties because of a 
conflicting interest” if lawyers have duties to both nonclients and 
clients.104 
The Trask Court provided lower courts with guidance by establishing 
the Trask factors to apply in similar cases. However, lower courts may 
feel pressure to find that the Trask factors weigh in favor of attorneys 
because of the Court’s concerns about attorney obligations and potential 
conflicts of interest.105 The next two sections discuss two cases in which 
the Washington State courts of appeal applied the Trask balancing test 
without any indication that the Trask factors may weigh in favor of the 
nonclient beneficiary.106 
C. The Parks Court Applied the Trask Balancing Test, but Still Held 
that the Estate Planning Attorney Did Not Owe a Duty of Care to 
Nonclients 
In Parks v. Fink, the Washington Court of Appeals Division I held 
that an attorney did not owe a prospective beneficiary a duty of care to 
promptly execute a will. In 2005, John Balko, a terminal cancer patient, 
executed a valid will devising his estate.107 However, the will contained 
a typographical error: it left “Betty Rich” the residue of his estate instead 
of the intended “Betty Parks.”108 
An attorney, Janyce Fink, legally advised Mr. Balko in various roles 
over six years.109 She met with a hospitalized Mr. Balko to discuss this 
                                                     
101. See id. at 843–45, 872 P.2d at 1085–86.  
102. See id. at 845, 872 P.2d at 1085. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 844, 872 P.2d at 1085.  
105. Id. (“A conflict of interest arises in estate matters whenever the interest of the personal 
representative is not harmonious with the interest of an heir. Because estate proceedings may be 
adversarial, we conclude that policy considerations also disfavor the finding of a duty to estate 
beneficiaries.”).  
106. Linth v. Gay, 190 Wash. App. 331, 360 P.3d 844 (2015); Parks v. Fink, 173 Wash. App. 
366, 293 P.3d 1275 (2013). 
107. Parks, 173 Wash. App. at 368, 293 P.3d at 1276.  
108. Id.  
109. Id.  
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error and prepare a new will to correct it.110 On April 26, 2006, Ms. Fink 
brought a new will to the hospital with several blank spaces for Mr. 
Balko to complete.111 Mr. Balko and Ms. Fink filled in the blank spaces 
on a new will and Mr. Balko signed the draft in Ms. Fink’s presence.112 
One space that Mr. Balko filled in stated: “If Betty Parks does not 
survive me, I give the residue of my estate as follows: Terry Parks (son 
of Betty Parks).”113 
Ms. Fink did not intend that draft to be the final version of the will 
because neither a witness nor notary was present.114 She allegedly 
explained to Mr. Balko that a will remains invalid until it is signed, 
witnessed, and notarized.115 She advised Mr. Balko to sign a final 
version of the draft with the proper formalities but he declined several 
times because he wanted to wait until he was in better health.116 In July 
2007, Mr. Balko passed away before formally executing the April 2006 
draft, meaning it did not revoke his previous will, dated 2005.117 
Mr. Terry Parks, who would have benefitted from formal execution of 
the April 2006 draft, filed a malpractice claim against Ms. Fink and Fink 
Law Group PLLC.118 The trial court granted Ms. Fink’s summary 
judgment motion because Mr. Parks did not have standing.119 
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, holding that Ms. Fink did 
not owe Mr. Parks a duty of care.120 The court emphasized the type of 
malpractice alleged here: failure to promptly execute a will.121 This kind 
of error is distinct from the duty of an attorney to ensure that a will 
meets the required formalities when executed and does not contain 
drafting errors.122 It differs largely because holding an attorney to this 
                                                     
110. Id.  
111. Id.  
112. Id.  
113. Id. at 368–69, 293 P.3d at 1276 (italics in original).  
114. Id. at 369, 293 P.3d at 1277.  
115. Id.  
116. Id. at 370, 293 P.3d at 1277. 
117. Id. at 373, 293 P.3d at 1278.  
118. Id. at 373, 293 P.3d at 1279. Under the first will, Mr. Craig Eckland was the will’s 
beneficiary after Betty Parks’s death. Id. at 370, 293 P.3d at 1277. Under the proposed change to the 
will, Mr. Terry Parks would have taken Mr. Eckland’s position. Id.  
119. Id. at 373, 293 P.3d at 1279.  
120. Id. at 389, 293 P.3d at 1287.  
121. Id. at 378–79, 293 P.3d at 1281–82.  
122. Id.; cf. Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 18 (Cal. 1958) (holding that the defendant 
negligently failed to have decedent’s will properly attested); Licata v. Spector, 225 A.2d 28, 30–31 
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standard of care for a nonclient’s benefit conflicts with an attorney’s 
duty of undivided loyalty to his or her client.123 
The Parks Court applied the Trask balancing test, but it only 
discussed two of the six Trask factors and made a quick determination 
that the attorney did not owe the nonclient a duty of care.124 After 
weighing the Trask factors, the court held that imposing a duty of care 
on Ms. Fink to the nonclient, Mr. Parks, “would severely compromise 
the attorney’s duty of undivided loyalty to the client and impose an 
untenable burden on the attorney-client relationship.”125 Because 
attorneys primarily owe a duty of loyalty to their clients, it would be 
difficult for attorneys to also follow intended beneficiaries’ desires; 
while the beneficiaries may want a will executed swiftly to ensure their 
benefits, a client may wish to take extra time to consider his or her 
testamentary intentions.126 
Cases from several other jurisdictions were persuasive authority in the 
Parks Court’s decision that an attorney does not owe nonclients a duty 
of prompt will execution.127 The court aligned itself with the majority of 
other jurisdictions128 and upheld Washington ethics rules while doing 
so.129 Washington’s ethics rules require attorneys to provide undivided 
loyalty to their clients, which attorneys should not sacrifice to meet 
another’s needs or wishes.130 
The Parks decision provides lower courts with persuasive authority, 
but Washington case law provides little additional explanation of the 
Trask factors outside of this fact pattern. The Parks holding is likely 
limited to situations where the claim at issue is the failure to promptly 
execute an estate planning document, such as a will. If lower courts face 
                                                     
(Conn. C.P. 1966) (holding that an attorney negligently failed to meet statutory attestation 
requirements when executing decedent’s will).  
123. Parks, 173 Wash. App. at 378–79, 293 P.3d at 1281–82. 
124. Id. at 377–78, 293 P.3d at 1280–81. The Trask factors discussed by the court were “the 
policy of preventing future harm” and “the extent to which the profession would be unduly 
burdened by a finding of liability.” Id. at 377, 293 P.2d at 1281.   
125. Id. at 368, 293 P.3d at 1276.  
126. See id. at 379–83, 293 P.3d at 1282–84. 
127. Id. at 379–88, 293 P.3d at 1282–86 (citing Hall v. Kalfayan, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 629 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2010); Radovich v. Locke-Paddon, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Krawczyk v. 
Stingle, 543 A.2d 733 (Conn. 1988); Sisson v. Jankowski, 809 A.2d 1265 (N.H. 2002); Rydde v. 
Morris, 675 S.E.2d 431 (S.C. 2009)).  
128. See infra section III.B 
129. Parks, 173 Wash. App. at 388, 293 P.3d at 1286.  
130. Id. at 388–89, 293 P.3d at 1286–87; see also Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 105 Wash. 
2d 381, 388, 715 P.2d 1133, 1137 (1986).  
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facts similar to Parks—a nonclient sues an estate planning attorney 
because the attorney failed to execute an estate planning document 
before the testator’s death—then the courts have clear guidance on how 
the Trask balancing test applies. Essentially, those facts require privity 
and the application of the Trask balancing test is a mere formality—as 
the following discussion of another court of appeals decision 
confirms.131 However, under different facts, lower courts question 
whether the Trask balancing test remains a mere formality.132 
D. The Linth Court’s Recent Holding Confirms that Washington Is 
Reaching Strict Privity Outcomes Even While Applying the Trask 
Balancing Test 
In Linth v. Gay, the Washington State Court of Appeals Division II 
found Parks controlling in a malpractice claim brought by a trust 
beneficiary.133 The court held that the attorney-defendant in Linth did 
not owe the nonclient trust beneficiary a duty of care where the attorney 
did not promptly execute trust documents.134 
In 2000, Evelyn Plant hired Carl Gay to create a living trust that 
provided $100,000 and a life estate in a portion of property to Jennifer 
Linth.135 Later that year, Ms. Plant amended the trust and appointed 
Daniel Doran as the new trustee after resigning from the position 
herself.136 The amendment provided that $50,000 and Ms. Plant’s 
property was to be given to a foundation in Ms. Plant’s name after Ms. 
Linth’s life estate terminated.137 The amendment referenced a document 
that would set the terms of the nonprofit foundation.138 However, the 
attorney failed to attach the document to the trust amendment.139 
While Ms. Plant was living, the attorney drafted some plans for the 
foundation, none of which the attorney formally executed.140 When Ms. 
Plant passed away, the amendment’s validity was disputed because the 
                                                     
131. See infra section II.D.  
132. See infra Part IV.  
133. Linth v. Gay, 190 Wash. App. 331, 339, 360 P.3d 844, 849 (2015). 
134. Id.  
135. Id. at 333, 360 P.3d at 845–46. 
136. Id. at 334, 360 P.3d at 846. 
137. Id. The foundation was the Evelyn Plant Green Point Foundation. Id. at 333, 360 P.3d at 
845.  
138. Id. at 334, 360 P.3d at 846.  
139. Id.  
140. Id.  
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attorney never completed nor attached the referenced plans.141 In 2009, 
Ms. Linth, as a trust beneficiary, initiated malpractice claims against Mr. 
Gay, alleging that he had to a duty to attach the foundation plans to the 
trust amendment before his client’s death.142 The superior court granted 
Mr. Gay’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Mr. Gay did not 
owe a duty to Ms. Linth.143 Ms. Linth appealed her claims to the 
Washington State court of appeals.144 
Ms. Linth also alleged that Mr. Gay negligently represented the 
successor trustee, Mr. Doran, after Ms. Plant passed away.145 The court 
dismissed these claims based on the Trask decision.146 Because Ms. 
Linth had alternative methods of holding Mr. Gay accountable for his 
duties to Mr. Doran, the court found the following concern expressed in 
Trask inapplicable: “[i]n finding a duty to beneficiaries under the multi-
factor balancing test, we recognized ‘if the beneficiaries could not 
recover for the attorney’s alleged negligence, no one could.’”147 
The Linth Court found Parks controlling.148 The issue in Linth was 
very similar to that in Parks; however, it revolved around the prompt 
execution of trust documents rather than the prompt execution of a 
will.149 Because the facts closely resembled Parks, the court found its 
holding determinative.150 The court stated, “as in Parks, the Trust 
documents were not properly executed before Plant’s death.”151 
The Linth decision steered the direction of Washington case law 
toward requiring privity and continued the line of reasoning in Parks. As 
in Parks, the Trask balancing test took a backseat to privity in Linth. The 
court noted that alternative methods of justice for plaintiffs weighed in 
favor of dismissing the claims against the attorney.152 The court 
                                                     
141. Id. at 335, 360 P.3d at 846. Ms. Linth signed a Nonjudical Dispute Resolution Agreement 
(NDRA) to resolve the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA) action between her and 
Crista Ministries, a beneficiary under the original trust. Mr. Doran was removed as trustee in the 
NDRA. Id.  
142. Id. at 337, 360 P.3d at 848. Ms. Linth and Mr. Gay agreed to toll the statute of limitations for 
Ms. Linth’s claims against Mr. Gay. Id. at 335, 360 P.3d at 846. 
143. Id. at 335, 360 P.3d at 846–47. 
144. Id.  
145. Id. at 341, 360 P.3d at 849.  
146. Id. at 341–42, 360 P.3d at 849–50. 
147. Id. at 341, 360 P.3d at 850.  
148. Id. at 339, 360 P.3d at 849. 
149. Id. at 333–34, 360 P.3d at 846.  
150. Id. at 338–39, 360 P.3d at 848–49. 
151. Id. at 339, 360 P.3d at 848–49. 
152. Id. at 342, 360 P.3d at 850. 
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acknowledged that the Trask balancing test existed for a reason: to give 
nonclients some limited opportunities to sue for legal malpractice.153 
However, merely acknowledging the possibility of standing under the 
Trask balancing test does not give plaintiffs hope that they may actually 
have it. 
As of summer 2016, Washington courts have not found in favor of 
nonclient-plaintiffs in estate planning cases under the Trask balancing 
test. The lack of precedent in favor of nonclients suggests that 
Washington is adhering more to strict privity than court opinions 
indicate. However, the possibility remains that under the right facts, a 
nonclient-plaintiff may have standing. 
III. STATES VARY WIDELY IN THEIR APPROACHES TO 
ESTATE PLANNING ATTORNEYS’ DUTIES TO 
NONCLIENTS 
Jurisdictions across the nation address the issue of nonclient standing 
in malpractice actions using a range of methods. If Washington has an 
opportunity to address the issue again, courts will likely turn to leading 
cases in other jurisdictions for guidance. Important states to look to 
include California, Connecticut, Illinois, New Hampshire, and 
Pennsylvania because Washington relied on these jurisdictions when 
deciding Stangland,154 Trask,155 Parks,156 and Linth.157 
A. A Minority of States Adheres to the Strict Privity Rule and Holds 
that Nonclients Cannot Sue Estate Planning Attorneys for 
Malpractice 
A minority of states adheres to the strict privity rule. These states 
include Alabama,158 Arkansas,159 Colorado,160 Maryland,161 
                                                     
153. See id. at 341–42, 360 P.3d at 849–50. 
154. Stangland v. Brock, 109 Wash. 2d 675, 680–84, 747 P.2d 464, 467–69 (1987).  
155. Trask v. Butler, 123 Wash. 2d 835, 841–42, 872 P.2d 1080, 1083–84 (1994). 
156. Parks v. Fink, 173 Wash. App. 366, 379–89, 293 P.3d 1275, 1282–87 (2013). 
157. Linth, 190 Wash. App. at 338–39, 360 P.3d at 848. 
158. See Robinson v. Benton, 842 So. 2d 631, 637 (Ala. 2002); Peterson v. Anderson, 719 So. 2d 
216, 218–19 (Ala. 1997). 
159. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-310 (2005); McDonald v. Pettus, 988 S.W.2d 9, 12–14 (Ark. 
1999). 
160. See Baker v. Wood, Ris & Hames, Prof’l Corp., 2016 CO 5, ¶¶ 20–28; Allen v. Steele, 252 
P.3d 476, 482, 486 (Colo. 2011). 
161. See Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1268, 1279 (Md. 1998). 
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Massachusetts,162 Nebraska,163 Ohio,164 and Virginia.165 Under the strict 
privity rule, nonclients only have a cause of action against attorneys 
when the attorney commits fraud or a malicious or tortious act, such as 
negligent misrepresentation.166 Otherwise, “[a] person authorized to 
practice law owes no duty except that arising from contract or from a 
gratuitous undertaking.”167 Maine,168 New York,169 and Texas170 apply 
the strict privity rule with a limited exception allowing a legal 
malpractice cause of action by an estate’s personal representative against 
an estate planning attorney. 
Despite being a minority position, the strict privity rule is justified by 
confidentiality, predictability, and fairness principles. One court noted, 
“the greater good is served by preserving a bright-line privity rule which 
denies a cause of action to all beneficiaries whom the attorney did not 
represent.”171 Many courts applying the strict privity rule support the 
position by arguing that without it, the law would deny parties’ freedom 
of contract and the potential liability would impose a significant burden 
on the parties in contract.172 Strict privity protects the attorney-client 
relationship and confidential attorney-client communications.173 It also 
                                                     
162. See Miller v. Mooney, 725 N.E.2d 545, 549–50 (Mass. 2000).  
163. See Lilyhorn v. Dier, 335 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Neb. 1983).  
164. See Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger, 118 Ohio St. 3d 226, 2008-Ohio-2012, 887 N.E.2d 1167, 
1168; Simon v. Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio 1987).  
165. See Johnson v. Hart, 692 S.E.2d 239, 243–44 (Va. 2010).  
166. See In re Hanes, 214 B.R. 786, 823 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); Allen v. Steele, 252 P.3d 476, 
484 (Colo. 2011); Estate of Schneider v. Finmann, 933 N.E.2d 718, 720 (N.Y. 2010); Leff v. 
Fulbright & Jaworski LLP, 911 N.Y.S.2d 320, 321 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).  
167. See Peterson v. Anderson, 719 So. 2d 216, 218 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (citing Shows v. 
NCNB Nat’l Bank of N.C., 585 So. 2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1991)); Robinson v. Benton, 842 So. 2d 631, 
637 (Ala. 2002).  
168. See Nevin v. Union Trust Co., 1999 ME 47, ¶¶ 39–41, 726 A.2d 694, 701. 
169. See Estate of Schneider v. Finmann, 933 N.E.2d 718, 719 (N.Y. 2010). 
170. See Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 780, 782 (Tex. 2006); 
Barcelo v. Elliot, 923 S.W.2d 575, 582 (Tex. 1996) (Spector, J., dissenting).  
171. Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 577–79; see also Baker v. Wood, Ris & Hames, Prof’l Corp., 2016 
CO 5 ¶ 23 (quoting Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1270 (Md. 1998)) (“While the testator/client is 
alive, the lawyer owes him or her a ‘duty of complete and undivided loyalty.’ The strict privity rule 
protects an attorney’s obligation to direct his or her full attention to the needs of the client. An 
attorney’s preoccupation or concern with potential negligence claims by third parties might result in 
a diminution in the quality of the legal services received by the client as the attorney might weigh 
the client’s interests against the attorney’s fear of liability to a third party.”).  
172. Joan Teshima, Attorney’s Liability, to One Other Than Immediate Client, for Negligence in 
Connection with Legal Duties, 61 A.L.R. 4th 615, 624 (originally published in 1988).  
173. Casteel et al., supra note 7, at 47.  
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limits the number of parties with standing, thereby decreasing lawsuits 
and promoting efficiency.174 
Notwithstanding its benefits, the strict privity rule may allow a 
negligent attorney to escape liability when intended beneficiaries only 
realize the attorney’s mistake after a client’s death. New York describes 
the tug-of-war at play between attorney liability and lack of 
accountability: “This rule effectively protects attorneys from legal 
malpractice suits by indeterminate classes of plaintiffs whose interests 
may be at odds with the interests of the client-decedent. However, it also 
leaves the estate with no recourse against an attorney who planned the 
estate negligently.”175 Because of strict privity’s constraints, most 
jurisdictions recognize an exception to privity under certain 
circumstances. 
B. A Majority of States Recognizes a Possible Cause of Action by 
Nonclients Under a Third Party Contract Theory, a Negligence 
Tort Theory, or a Balancing Test 
The majority of states recognizes an exception to the strict privity rule 
based on one of three theories: (1) a third party beneficiary contract 
theory; (2) the foreseeable harm to third parties doctrine in tort law; or 
(3) a balancing test of several factors. The majority group includes the 
following states: California,176 Connecticut,177 Delaware,178 District of 
Columbia,179 Florida,180 Georgia,181 Hawaii,182 Idaho,183 Illinois,184 
                                                     
174. See id. 
175. Estate of Schneider v. Finmann, 933 N.E.2d 718, 720 (N.Y. 2010).  
176. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687 (Cal. 1961) (applying a balancing test).  
177. Krawczyk v. Stingle, 543 A.2d 733, 735 (Conn. 1988) (“[A] number of jurisdictions have 
recognized an exception to this general rule [of no liability] when the plaintiff can demonstrate that 
he or she was the intended or foreseeable beneficiary of the attorney’s services.”). See generally 
Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81 (Conn. 1981); Licata v. Spector, 225 A.2d 28 (Conn. C.P. 1966).  
178. See Pinckney v. Tigani, No. Civ.A. 02C-08-129FSS, 2004 WL 2827896, *5–*8 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Nov. 30, 2004) (discussing various approaches including strict privity, a balancing test, and a 
third party contract theory). 
179. See Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062–63 (D.C. 1983) (applying a tort theory).  
180. See Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d 1378, 1380 (Fla. 
1993) (applying a third party contract theory); Kinney v. Shinholser, 663 So. 2d 643, 646–47 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (same). 
181. See Young v. Williams, 645 S.E.2d 624, 626 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (applying a third party 
contract theory). 
182. See Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 464–68 (Haw. 2001) (applying a balancing test after 
recognizing a cause of action was possible under both tort theories and contract theories). 
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Indiana,185 Iowa,186 Kansas,187 Kentucky,188 Louisiana,189 Michigan,190 
Minnesota,191 Missouri,192 Montana,193 New Hampshire,194 New 
Mexico,195 Oklahoma,196 Oregon,197 Pennsylvania,198 Rhode Island,199 
South Carolina,200 South Dakota,201 Washington,202 West Virginia,203 
                                                     
183. See Soignier v. Fletcher, 256 P.3d 730, 732–34 (Idaho 2011); Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 90 
P.3d 884, 889 (Idaho 2004) (holding that an attorney’s duty of care extended to named beneficiaries 
in will under a tort theory). 
184. See Ogle v. Fuiten, 466 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ill. 1984) (applying a third party contract theory, 
but suggesting that a tort theory may support a cause of action, too); Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 
N.E.2d 96, 100 (Ill. 1982) (“We conclude that, for a nonclient to succeed in a negligence action 
against an attorney, he must prove that the primary purpose and intent of the attorney-client 
relationship itself was to benefit or influence the third party.”); Neal v. Baker, 551 N.E.2d 704, 706 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (“Plaintiff’s mere assertion that the attorney was hired with the intent to directly 
benefit plaintiff is not sufficient to state a cause of action. The intent plaintiff referred to in her 
complaint was nothing more than the general intent implicit in an executor hiring an attorney to 
assist in administering an estate. We hold no duty extends to a beneficiary under these 
circumstances.”). 
185. See Walker v. Lawson, 526 N.E.2d 968, 968 (Ind. 1988) (applying a third party contract 
theory); Ferguson v. O’Bryan, 996 N.E.2d 428, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a drafting 
attorney who is aware that intended beneficiaries exist may be liable to nonclients).  
186. See St. Malachy Roman Catholic Congregation of Geneseo v. Ingram, 841 N.W.2d 338, 351 
(Iowa 2013) (applying a tort theory); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682–83 (Iowa 1987) 
(recognizing a cause of action under both tort and contract theories). 
187. See Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 51 (Kan. 1990) (applying a balancing test).  
188. See Goodman v. Goldberg & Simpson, P.S.C., 323 S.W.3d 740, 747–48 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009) 
(applying a third party contract theory). 
189. See Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So. 2d 419, 425 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (applying a third party 
contract theory). 
190. See Mieras v. DeBona, 550 N.W.2d 202, 211–12 (Mich. 1996) (discussing both tort and 
third party contract theories). 
191. See Francis v. Piper, 597 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (applying a third party contract 
theory).  
192. See Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson, & Kilroy, P.C. 900 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1995) (applying a 
tort theory). 
193. See Stanley L. & Carolyn M. Watkins Trust v. Lacosta, 2004 MT 144, 321 Mont. 432, 92 
P.3d 620 (applying a tort theory). 
194. See Simpson v. Calivas, 650 A.2d 318, 321 (N.H. 1994) (applying a tort theory). 
195. See Leyba v. Whitley, 907 P.2d 172, 179 (N.M. 1995) (applying a balancing test). 
196. See Hesser v. Cent. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Enid, 1998 OK 15, ¶ 13, 956 P.2d 864, 867 
(applying a third party contract theory). 
197. See Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292–93 (Or. 1987) (discussing both a tort theory and a 
contract theory). 
198. See Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 746 (Pa. 1983) (applying a third party contract 
theory). 
199. See Credit Union Cent. Falls v. Groff, 966 A.2d 1262, 1272 (R.I. 2009) (applying a third 
party contract theory).  
200. See Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 132, 141 (S.C. 2014) (recognizing claims under both tort 
and third-party beneficiary theories).  
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Wisconsin,204 and Wyoming.205 Mississippi has completely rid itself of 
the privity doctrine through legislation.206 Other jurisdictions have not 
directly addressed the issue. These states include: Arizona,207 Alaska, 
Delaware, Nevada, New Jersey,208 North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Tennessee,209 Utah,210 and Vermont.211 
Under what is known as the “Florida-Iowa Rule,” some jurisdictions 
hold that nonclients may only bring a lawsuit against an estate planning 
attorney if the testator named the nonclients in the will or trust.212 In 
Florida, liability only arises if “due to the attorney’s professional 
negligence, the testamentary intent, as expressed in the will, is frustrated, 
and the beneficiary’s legacy is lost or diminished as a direct result of that 
negligence.”213 Likewise, in Iowa, liability only arises when “as a direct 
result of the lawyer’s professional negligence the testator’s intent as 
                                                     
201. See Friske v. Hogan, 2005 SD 70, ¶¶ 12–20, 698 N.W.2d 526, 530–31 (applying a third 
party beneficiary theory and holding that an attorney-client relationship was formed under a tort 
theory). 
202. See Trask v. Butler, 123 Wash. 2d 835, 842–45, 872 P.2d 1080, 1084–85 (applying a 
balancing test). 
203. See Calvert v. Scharf, 619 S.E.2d 197, 207 (W. Va. 2005) (applying a tort theory). 
204. See Auric v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 331 N.W.2d 325, 328 (Wis. 1983) (applying a tort theory); 
Anderson v. McBurney, 467 N.W.2d 158, 160–61 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (same).  
205. See In re Estate of Drwenski, 2004 WY 5, ¶¶ 30–39, 83 P.3d 457, 464–67 (applying a 
balancing test). 
206. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (2016). 
207. See Fickett v. Super. Ct. of Pima Cty, 27 Ariz. App. 793, 795 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) 
(applying a balancing test, although not in the estate planning context). 
208. See Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354, 1361–62 (N.J. 1995) (holding a real estate 
attorney may owe a duty of care to a nonclient relying on the attorney’s reports under a tort theory). 
209. See Wright v. Linebarger Googan Blair & Sampson, LLP, 782 F. Supp. 2d 593, 612 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2011) (holding law firm was not liable to third party, yet recognizing that an attorney may be 
liable to third parties for negligent preparation of real estate documents under Tennessee law); 
Harriet & Henderson Yarns, Inc. v. Castle, 75 F. Supp. 2d 818, 824–25 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (holding 
that nonclients could not bring a negligence cause of action against an attorney because they were 
neither the attorney’s clients nor third party intended beneficiaries).  
210. See Winters v. Schulman, 1999 UT App 119, ¶¶ 24–26, 977 P.2d 1218, 1225 (holding that a 
nonclient may not recover from attorney for negligence under third party beneficiary theory unless 
the nonclient proves that the primary intent of the client’s relationship with the attorney was for the 
nonclient’s benefit). 
211. See Hedges v. Durrance, 2003 VT 63, 175 Vt. 588, 590–91, 834 A.2d 1, 4–5 (holding that an 
attorney did not owe a duty of care to a nonclient in a different context). 
212. See Baker v. Wood, Ris & Hames, Prof’l Corp., 2016 CO 5, ¶¶ 44–50 (discussing the 
“Florida-Iowa” rule); DeMaris v. Asti, 426 So.2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Schreiner v. 
Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa 1987); Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 132, 138–41 (S.C. 
2014) (discussing the “Florida-Iowa” rule, but ultimately rejecting it).  
213. See DeMaris, 426 So.2d at 1154 (emphasis in original).  
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expressed in the testamentary instruments is frustrated in whole or in 
part and the beneficiary’s interest in the estate is either lost, diminished, 
or unrealized.”214 Several states in the majority group have adopted this 
rule to limit the causes of action brought by nonclients. These states 
include: California,215 Florida,216 Hawaii,217 Idaho,218 Iowa,219 
Pennsylvania,220 South Carolina,221 and South Dakota.222 
C. Washington Courts May Find the Approaches of California, 
Connecticut, Illinois, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania 
Persuasive 
The Washington State Supreme Court relied on California,223 
Connecticut,224 Illinois,225 and Pennsylvania226 when it decided 
                                                     
214. See Schreiner, 410 N.W.2d at 683.  
215. See Hall v. Kalfayan, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 629, 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a court-
appointed attorney did not owe a duty of care to a prospective beneficiary’s conservator when the 
will did not name the prospective beneficiary).  
216. See Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d 1378, 1380 (Fla. 
1993); Babcock v. Malone, 760 So. 2d 1056, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that nonclient-
plaintiffs could not sue the drafting attorney because the testator’s will did not name them and the 
testator’s intent was unclear).  
217. See Young v. Van Buren, No. 28543, 2010 WL 4278321, at *3–4 (Haw. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 
2010), as corrected (Nov. 23, 2010) (In an unpublished disposition, the court rejected malpractice 
claims brought by a testator’s son because the son was not the intended beneficiary of the trust 
amendments and thus, the attorney did not owe him any duty.).  
218. See Soignier v. Fletcher, 256 P.3d 730, 733–34 (Idaho 2011) (“Attorneys do not have to 
postulate whether a testator intended to do something other than what is expressed in the 
will. . . . [And] attorneys have no ongoing duty to monitor the legal status of the property mentioned 
in a testamentary instrument.”); Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 90 P.3d 884, 888 (Idaho 2004).  
219. See Schreiner, 410 N.W.2d at 682 (holding that “a lawyer owes a duty of care to the direct, 
intended, and specifically identifiable beneficiaries of the testator as expressed in the testator’s 
testamentary instruments”).  
220. See Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 746 (Pa. 1983) (holding that while California’s 
balancing test was too broad, a nonclient may bring a cause of action if the client’s will expressly 
named the nonclient intended beneficiaries and the testator’s intent was to benefit the intended 
beneficiaries).  
221. See Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 132, 140 (S.C. 2014) (holding that beneficiaries named or 
identified in the estate planning document could bring a malpractice cause of action against the 
attorney for poor drafting).  
222. See Friske v. Hogan, 2005 SD 70, ¶¶ 10–17, 698 N.W.2d 526, 529–31 (holding that there is an 
exception to the privity rule when a nonclient is the direct, intended beneficiary of the lawyer’s services 
to the testator).  
223. Trask v. Butler, 123 Wash. 2d 835, 841, 872 P.2d 1080, 1083–84 (1994) (citing Goldberg v. 
Frye, 266 Cal. Rptr. 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)); Stangland v. Brock, 109 Wash. 2d 675, 680, 747 
P.2d 464, 467 (1987) (citing Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1969); Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 
685 (Cal. 1961)).  
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Stangland and Trask. The court of appeals similarly relied on 
California,227 Connecticut,228 and New Hampshire,229 when deciding 
Parks. The leading cases in each of these jurisdictions may help predict 
how the Trask balancing test will apply in the future Washington cases. 
1. California’s Balancing Test Is a Model for Many States, Including 
Washington 
California leads other jurisdictions in estate planning malpractice 
liability because of its early decision to overrule the strict privity rule 
and create a balancing test to determine whether nonclients have 
standing to sue estate planning attorneys.230 The balancing test, first set 
forth in Lucas v. Hamm,231 considers the extent to which the testator 
intended the transaction to affect the beneficiary; the foreseeability of 
harm to the beneficiary; the degree of certainty that the beneficiary 
suffered the harm; the closeness of connection between the attorney’s 
conduct and the injury; and the policy of preventing future harm.232 In 
creating this test, California overruled a previous decision holding that a 
lack of privity between will beneficiaries and the drafting attorneys 
precludes the beneficiaries from having a cause of action against the 
attorneys.233 
                                                     
224. Stangland, 109 Wash. 2d at 681, 747 P.2d at 467 (citing Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81 
(Conn. 1981)).  
225. Trask, 123 Wash. 2d at 842, 872 P.2d at 1084 (citing Neal v. Baker, 551 N.E.2d 704, (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1990)); Stangland, 109 Wash. 2d at 681, 747 P.2d at 467 (citing Pelham v. Griesheimer, 
440 N.E.2d 96 (Ill. 1982)). 
226. Stangland, 109 Wash. 2d at 681, 747 P.2d at 467 (citing Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744 
(Pa. 1983)).  
227. Parks v. Fink, 173 Wash. App. 366, 379, 385, 293 P.3d 1275, 1282, 1284 (2013) (citing 
Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958); Hall v. Kalfayan, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2010); Radovich v. Locke-Paddon, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)).  
228. Parks, 173 Wash. App. at 379, 382, 293 P.3d at 1282, 1283 (citing Krawczyk v. Stingle, 543 
A.2d 733 (Conn. 1988); Licata v. Spector, 225 A.2d 28 (Conn. C.P. 1966)). 
229. Parks, 173 Wash. App. at 382–83, 293 P.3d at 1283–84 (citing Sisson v. Jankowski, 809 
A.2d 1265 (N.H. 2002)). 
230. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687–88 (Cal. 1961) (overruling Buckley v. Gray, 42 P. 900 
(Cal. 1895)). 
231. Id.  
232. Id.  
233. Id. (overruling Buckley v. Gray, 42 P. 900 (Cal. 1895)). 
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California’s multifactor balancing test has become a model for other 
jurisdictions.234 California courts have held that the test weighs in favor 
of the nonclients on some occasions235 and in favor of the attorney on 
other occasions.236 California’s balancing test dictates that attorneys do 
not owe intended beneficiaries the duty to promptly execute a will or 
trust.237 Because of California’s leading position in this area of the law, 
Washington’s Trask balancing factors mirror California’s factors.238 
Likewise, in the prompt execution context, Washington applies the 
balancing test as California applies it—attorney-defendants are not liable 
to nonclients if the claim regards prompt execution.239 
2. Connecticut’s Precedent Involving Prompt Execution of Estate 
Planning Documents Persuaded Washington Courts to Deny 
Attorney Liability for Failure to Promptly Execute Documents 
Connecticut’s third party beneficiary theory, which supports the 
finding of a duty of care between attorneys and nonclients in limited 
circumstances, is persuasive authority in Washington decisions.240 As in 
several other jurisdictions, Connecticut holds that attorneys do not owe a 
duty of care to third parties for the prompt execution of estate planning 
                                                     
234. See Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 459–60 (Haw. 2001); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 
681–82 (Iowa 1987); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 48–50 (Kan. 1990); Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 
S.E.2d 132, 137–38 (S.C. 2014). 
235. See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 162 (Cal. 1969) (holding that the attorney violated 
his duty of care because he negligently failed to advise his client of the effects of a post-
testamentary marriage, causing the nonclient-plaintiffs to suffer “irremediable” damages).  
236. See, e.g., Hall v. Kalfayan, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 629, 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding an 
attorney did not owe a duty of care to a prospective beneficiary to have a will executed before the 
testator’s death); Goldberg v. Frye, 266 Cal. Rptr. 483, 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that 
legatees could not sue the estate administrator’s attorney because the primary purpose of the 
attorney-client relationship was not for the legatees’ benefit).  
237. See Hall, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 636 (holding an attorney did not owe a duty of care to a 
prospective beneficiary to have a will executed before the testator’s death). 
238. Trask v. Butler, 123 Wash. 2d 835, 843, 872 P.2d 1080, 1084 (1994). The Trask factors 
include the extent to which the transaction was intended to benefit the plaintiff; the foreseeability of 
harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; the closeness of the 
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury; the policy of preventing future harm; 
and the extent to which the profession would be unduly burdened by a finding of liability. Id.  
239. See Linth v. Gay, 190 Wash. App. 331, 338, 360 P.3d 844, 848 (2015); Parks v. Fink, 173 
Wash. App. 366, 377, 293 P.3d 1275, 1280 (2013); cf. Hall, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 636. 
240. Stangland v. Brock, 109 Wash. 2d 675, 681, 747 P.2d 464, 467 (1987) (citing Stowe v. 
Smith, 441 A.2d 81 (Conn. 1981)); Parks, 173 Wash. App. at 379, 382, 293 P.3d at 1282, 1283 
(citing Krawczyk v. Stingle, 543 A.2d 733 (Conn. 1988); Licata v. Spector, 225 A.2d 28 (Conn. 
C.P. 1966)). 
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documents.241 In Krawczyk v. Stingle,242 an attorney’s client expressed a 
desire to execute a trust to replace an existing will.243 However, the 
client was hospitalized and passed away shortly after conveying that 
desire.244 Because of the short amount of time, the client never signed 
the trust documents.245 While the client’s inability to sign the documents 
was unfortunate, the Court held that the attorney was not liable to the 
trust’s intended beneficiaries for failure to execute the trust documents 
swiftly before the client’s death.246 
The Washington State court of appeals relied on the Krawczyk 
Court’s reasoning when determining that estate planning attorneys did 
not owe a duty to nonclients to have estate planning documents promptly 
executed.247 Unlike cases in which attorneys fail to supervise a will’s 
execution,248 the issue in Krawczyk, as well as Parks and Linth, was 
“whether such liability should be further expanded to encompass 
negligent delay in completing and furnishing estate planning documents 
for execution by the client.”249 The Krawczyk Court distinguished the 
claim at issue from other claims of legal malpractice with widely 
persuasive reasoning. 
3. New Hampshire Authority Also Persuaded Washington to Deny 
Attorney Liability for Failure to Promptly Execute Estate Planning 
Documents 
The Washington State court of appeals viewed an influential New 
Hampshire case, Sisson v. Jankowski,250 as persuasive authority.251 In 
Sisson, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that an attorney did 
not owe a duty of care to prospective will beneficiaries to see that the 
testator promptly executed the will in question.252 The Sisson Court 
relied on different factors than those of other jurisdictions such as: “the 
                                                     
241. Krawczyk, 543 A.2d at 736. 
242. Id.  
243. Id. at 734. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 736.  
247. Parks v. Fink, 173 Wash. App. 366, 379, 293 P.3d 1275, 1282 (2013) (citing Krawczyk, 543 
A.2d 733). 
248. See Licata v. Spector, 225 A.2d 28 (Conn. C.P. 1966). 
249. Krawczyk, 543 A.2d at 735. 
250. 809 A.2d 1265 (N.H. 2002).  
251. Parks, 173 Wash. App. at 382–83, 293 P.3d at 1283–84 (citing Sisson, 809 A.2d 1265). 
252. Sisson, 809 A.2d at 1268–69.  
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societal interest involved, the severity of the risk, the likelihood of the 
occurrence, the relationship between the parties, and the burden upon the 
defendant.”253 
Outside of the prompt execution context, New Hampshire recognizes 
that a nonclient does not necessarily need a privity relationship with the 
attorney-defendant to bring a legal malpractice claim for negligent will 
drafting.254 Like other jurisdictions, New Hampshire found an exception 
to the privity rule appropriate under the third party beneficiary contract 
theory.255 The Court justified the exception, stating, “the obvious 
foreseeability of injury to the beneficiary demands an exception to the 
privity rule.”256  
4. Illinois’s Third Party Beneficiary Theory was Synthesized with a 
Balancing Test to Form Washington’s Modern Balancing Test 
Illinois’s authority on the third party beneficiary theory was 
persuasive authority in both the Stangland and Trask decisions.257 The 
test set forth in Neal v. Baker258 requires a nonclient to establish that 
both the primary purpose and intent of the attorney-client relationship 
was for the nonclient’s benefit.259 Neal’s test was previously established 
in Pelham v. Griesheimer.260 The Trask Court compared the third party 
beneficiary test to a balancing test, stating “[t]he two tests are 
indistinguishable in that their primary inquiry focuses on the purpose for 
establishing the attorney-client relationship . . . [t]o eliminate any 
confusion to trial courts we combine the two tests.”261 Washington 
combined this third party beneficiary concept with a multifactor 
balancing test and synthesized the important factors in determining 
whether an attorney owes a duty to a nonclient.262 
                                                     
253. Id. at 1267 (citing Hungerford v. Jones, 722 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1998)).  
254. Simpson v. Calivas, 650 A.2d 318, 321 (N.H. 1994).  
255. Id.  
256. Id. at 322.  
257. Trask v. Butler, 123 Wash.2d 835, 842, 872 P.2d 1080, 1084 (1994) (citing Neal v. Baker, 
551 N.E.2d 704, (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)); Stangland v. Brock, 109 Wash. 2d 675, 681, 747 P.2d 464, 
467 (1987) (citing Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96 (Ill. 1982)). 
258. 551 N.E.2d 704 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).  
259. Id. at 705–06. 
260. 440 N.E.2d 96, 100 (Ill. 1982) (“We conclude that, for a nonclient to succeed in a negligence 
action against an attorney, he must prove that the primary purpose and intent of the attorney-client 
relationship itself was to benefit or influence the third party.”). 
261. Trask, 123 Wash. 2d at 842, 872 P.2d at 1084.  
262. Id. at 842–43, 872 P.2d at 1084.  
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5. Pennsylvania’s Exception to Privity for Nonclients Expressly 
Named in the Estate Planning Documents Persuaded Washington 
that Strict Privity Is on the Decline 
Washington noted an important early Pennsylvania decision, in which 
the court recognized an attorney’s possible liability to nonclients for 
poor will drafting.263 In Guy v. Liederbach,264 the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held that named beneficiaries in a will could bring a cause 
of action against an attorney who failed to properly draft the will.265 
Rather than abolishing privity, Pennsylvania held that for a nonclient-
plaintiff to maintain a lawsuit based in assumpsit, she must either show 
an attorney-client relationship exists or an attorney specifically 
undertook to furnish professional services.266 Under this reasoning, an 
unintended beneficiary of an estate planning document cannot sue an 
attorney for negligent drafting of the document.267 In acknowledging 
Guy, the Stangland Court further supported its notion that the privity 
trend was diminishing, largely because of the third party beneficiary 
theory on which Guy relied.268 
IV. WASHINGTON COURTS NEED CLARITY: UNDER WHAT 
CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT THE TRASK BALANCING TEST 
WEIGH IN FAVOR OF A NONCLIENT? 
Washington is not in the strict privity camp, so the state may 
recognize a nonclient’s cause of action against an attorney for legal 
malpractice. Yet, the breadth of that recognition remains undefined. In 
particular, the courts have not established whether it will limit causes of 
action to nonclients expressly named in estate planning documents or 
whether unnamed nonclients may also have causes of action. 
The Trask balancing test requires a case-by-case analysis and has the 
potential to elicit different results under different facts.269 However, 
Washington case law lacks clarity regarding the Trask balancing test’s 
application because the facts in precedent cases are similar and 
                                                     
263. Stangland v. Brock, 109 Wash. 2d 675, 681, 747 P.2d 464, 467 (1987) (citing Guy v. 
Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983)). 
264. 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983). 
265. Id. at 752–53. 
266. Id. at 750.  
267. Id. at 751. See also Hess v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 925 A.2d 798, 806–07 (Pa. 2007). 
268. Stangland, 109 Wash. 2d at 681, 747 P.2d at 467.  
269. See supra Part I; section II.B. 
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narrow.270 As seen in Parks and Linth, in the case of prompt execution 
of estate planning documents, the Trask balancing test clearly weighs in 
favor of the attorney.271 But Washington lower courts find themselves in 
the dark when applying the Trask balancing test in estate planning cases 
dealing with issues other than prompt execution. If such a case makes its 
way to the Washington State Supreme Court, the Court will have the 
opportunity to clarify the Trask balancing test and opine as to whether 
the test weighs in favor of the nonclient. The following fact patterns, 
which have appeared before other jurisdictions, may shift the weight on 
the Trask scale. 
A. If There Is a Delay in the Execution of Estate Planning Documents, 
the Trask Factors Likely Favor the Attorney 
In situations where a nonclient claims an estate planning attorney 
breached a duty of care by failing to promptly execute an estate planning 
document, the Trask factors and similar balancing tests in other 
jurisdictions come out the same way: courts do not hold attorneys liable 
to nonclients.272 Both Parks and Linth hold that the Trask balancing test 
weighs in favor of the attorney when the client did not sign the estate 
planning document before death.273 Courts in many other jurisdictions 
hold the same.274 They commonly justify this position for two major 
reasons. First, it is possible that an estate planning document does not 
exist if the testator and attorney have not executed it. Second, without a 
signature attesting to the document’s contents, the testator’s intent is 
unclear. 
The first rationale is based on the key distinction between negligent 
drafting cases and prompt execution cases. In the first situation, a 
tangible document exists and may be in effect, while in the second, the 
document may not even exist yet. A clear line exists between these 
                                                     
270. See Linth v. Gay, 190 Wash. App. 331, 339, 360 P.3d 844, 849 (2015); Parks v. Fink, 173 
Wash. App. 366, 389, 293 P.3d 1275, 1287 (2013). 
271. See Linth, 190 Wash. App. at 339, 360 P.3d at 849; Parks, 173 Wash. App. at 389, 293 P.3d 
at 1287.  
272. See Krawczyk v. Stingle, 543 A.2d 733, 736 (Conn. 1988); Sisson v. Jankowski, 809 A.2d 
1265, 1270 (N.H. 2002); Rydde v. Morris, 675 S.E.2d 431, 433–35 (S.C. 2009); Linth, 190 Wash. 
App. at 339, 360 P.3d at 849; Parks, 173 Wash. App. at 378, 293 P.3d at 1281. 
273. Linth, 190 Wash. App. 331, 338, 360 P.3d 844, 848 (addressing the prompt execution of a 
trust attachment); Parks, 173 Wash. App. at 377, 293 P.3d at 1280 (addressing the prompt execution 
of a will).  
274. See Rydde, 675 S.E.2d at 433–35; Sisson, 809 A.2d at 1270.  
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claims because “an attorney owes no duty to a prospective beneficiary of 
a nonexistent will.”275 
The second rationale reasons that a testator’s intent is unclear until an 
executed document exists. Without a signature, many individuals, 
including the client’s attorney, cannot be certain that the document 
adequately reflects the testator’s intentions. Attorneys must not force a 
client to execute a document; rather, they must execute the document in 
the proper legal manner after clients affirmatively decide that they wish 
to execute it.276 An attorney may feel pressure to force a client to quickly 
sign a document if a third party has great stakes in the document and has 
standing to sue the attorney afterwards.277 
Considering these rationales, some courts may find a bright-line rule 
requiring privity appropriate in prompt execution cases. However, the 
Trask balancing test is still necessary. In a recent Pennsylvania case, 
Estate of Agnew v. Ross,278 an attorney had a meeting with a near-death 
client who was prepared to execute an estate planning document.279 
However, the attorney forgot to bring the document to the meeting, and 
the client passed away before signing it.280 The court allowed nonclient 
intended beneficiaries to bring a cause of action against the attorney 
under a third party beneficiary contract theory.281 
Although the issue in Estate of Agnew was failure of prompt 
execution, it stands in stark contrast to Parks and Linth because the 
testator’s intent was clear: he was prepared to sign the document and 
wished to do so.282 The attorney’s mistake in not bringing the document 
to the client meeting was the only reason the client did not sign it, and 
likewise, the only reason the nonclients did not receive their intended 
                                                     
275. Rydde, 675 S.E.2d at 432.  
276. See id. at 433–34.  
277. Krawczyk, 543 A.2d at 736 (“Imposition of liability would create an incentive for an 
attorney to exert pressure on a client to complete and execute estate planning documents summarily. 
Fear of liability to potential third party beneficiaries would contravene the attorney’s primary 
responsibility to ensure that the proposed estate plan effectuates the client’s wishes and that the 
client understands the available options and the legal and practical implications of whatever course 
of action is ultimately chosen.”).  
278. 110 A.3d 1020 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). 
279. Id. at 1022.  
280. Id. at 1028 (“[The attorney] also stated that [the testator] ‘would have signed the amendment 
had I prepared it, but because it was not with me, it was not discussed and until I discussed it with 
him I can’t say for certain he would have signed it.’ . . . Moreover, [the attorney] conceded that his 
failure to bring the 2010 Trust Amendment to that meeting was an ‘[o]versight.’”).  
281. Id.  
282. Id.  
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benefit.283 Under these facts, a bright-line rule would be too harsh, so a 
court’s analysis under the Trask balancing test remains necessary. 
B. If the Document’s Express Provisions Frustrate the Testator’s 
Intent, the Trask Factors May Favor the Nonclient 
When presented with the right case, Washington may hold that 
nonclients expressly named in the estate planning document may bring a 
cause of action against the drafting attorney under the Trask balancing 
test, as other jurisdictions have held.284 Several states allow “a 
beneficiary [to] maintain a cause of action against the estate planning 
attorney only if the client’s intent, as expressed in the will (or other 
document), is frustrated.”285 This limitation requires that the frustration 
of a testator’s intent be apparent on the face of the will in order to avoid 
parol evidence.286 For example, Idaho holds that nonclients named as 
beneficiaries in a testamentary instrument are an exception to the privity 
rule.287 Similarly, Iowa creates an exception to the privity requirement 
when “as a direct result of the lawyer’s professional negligence the 
testator’s intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments is frustrated 
in whole or in part and the beneficiary’s interest in the estate is either 
lost, diminished, or unrealized.”288 
If the testator named the plaintiffs in the estate planning document, 
then the Trask factors largely favor the nonclient-plaintiffs and support a 
legal malpractice cause of action. On its face, the document would 
benefit the nonclient-plaintiff. An estate planning attorney could 
probably foresee harm to the nonclient-plaintiff because the testator 
expressly named the nonclient. Also, the nonclient-plaintiff’s injury 
would likely be connected to the estate planning attorney’s conduct. 
Additionally, the profession would not be greatly burdened. Rather, 
allowing named nonclients to bring malpractice causes of action would 
                                                     
283. Id.  
284. See supra section III.B. 
285. Bradley E.S. Fogel, Estate Planning Malpractice: Special Issues in Need of Special Care, 
GP SOLO LAW TRENDS & NEWS: ESTATE PLANNING (May 2005), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
newsletter/publications/law_trends_news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/0506_estate_estateplan
ning.html [https://perma.cc/A3PM-PUJ5]. See also Chang v. Lederman, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 758 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d 1378, 
1380 (Fla. 1993); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa 1987).  
286. Fogel, supra note 285.  
287. Soignier v. Fletcher, 256 P.3d 730, 732–33 (Idaho 2011) (citing Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 90 
P.3d 884 (Idaho 2004)). 
288. Schreiner, 410 N.W.2d at 683. 
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encourage better drafting, strengthen client relations, and limit the 
number of plaintiffs who could bring legal malpractice actions to those 
expressly named. 
Conversely, if the estate planning document does not name nonclient-
plaintiffs, the Trask factors favor the attorney. In that circumstance, the 
face of the document does not clearly show that the testator intended to 
benefit the plaintiff through the testator’s transaction, that the attorney 
could foresee the harm, or that the attorney’s conduct certainly caused 
injury to the nonclient-plaintiff. From a policy perspective, preventing 
future harm may be difficult because of the challenge of determining 
whether an attorney named the correct individuals in estate planning 
documents. Additionally, legal malpractice actions would burden the 
estate planning profession if all frustrated nonclients unnamed in wills 
and trusts could bring malpractice lawsuits. 
When presented with the right facts, Washington may hold that the 
Trask balancing test does not allow nonclients to bring a cause of action 
unless the testator expressly named them in the documents. However, 
such a result may be too harsh because the approach fails to account for 
situations where nonclient-plaintiffs lose their cause of action as a direct 
result of the attorney’s negligence. For example, when a document does 
not expressly mention the nonclient-plaintiffs because of an attorney’s 
negligent drafting error, the nonclient-plaintiffs would lose their cause of 
action. 
Consider the fact pattern presented in an Oregon case, Hale v. 
Groce289: “[d]efendant, who is an attorney, was directed by a client to 
prepare testamentary instruments and to include a bequest of a specified 
sum to plaintiff. After the client’s death, it was discovered that the gift 
was not included either in the will or in a related trust instrument.”290 
The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the testator identified the intended 
beneficiary and told the attorney that he intended a $300,000 gift for that 
individual at his death, yet none of the estate planning documents 
provided for that gift.291 In Hale, the will and related trust document did 
not name the intended beneficiary because the drafting attorney 
negligently omitted the testator’s intended gift for the nonclient.292 The 
Court held that an attorney’s negligence might give rise to a nonclient’s 
cause of action against the attorney because a contract to include the 
                                                     
289. 744 P.2d 1289 (Or. 1987). 
290. Id. at 1290.  
291. Id. at 1293.  
292. Id.  
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nonclient beneficiary in an estate planning document creates a duty to 
both the client and the nonclient beneficiary.293 
These facts demonstrate circumstances in which the exception to the 
privity rule for intended beneficiaries expressly named in estate planning 
documents might be too narrow. The exception for expressly named 
plaintiffs appeals to courts because of its simplicity and bright line 
nature and appeals to attorneys because of its apparent outcome in favor 
of attorney-defendants under Trask.294 Yet, it could significantly curtail 
some deserving plaintiffs. For example, it does not provide the nonclient 
with recourse for situations when an attorney’s negligence results in the 
omission of the nonclient’s name.295 
C. If the Residuary Clause Is Negligently Omitted from an Estate 
Planning Document, the Trask Factors May Favor the Nonclient 
Under certain circumstances, the Trask balancing test may not only 
favor nonclients that the testator expressly named in estate planning 
documents, but also those nonclients who the attorney negligently 
excluded despite the testator’s intentions. Intended beneficiaries of an 
estate may wish to bring a malpractice action against an attorney who 
fails to include a residuary clause in an estate planning document. If 
Washington determines that the Trask balancing test favors the 
nonclients in this setting, then it will likely fall into the camp of states 
that recognize a cause of action when an estate planning document 
clearly frustrates the testator’s intent, even when the document does not 
expressly name the nonclients. 
In Arnold v. Carmichael,296 Florida held that a nonclient had a cause 
of action against the estate planning attorney because the omission of the 
residuary clause frustrated the testator-client’s intent.297 The court 
                                                     
293. Id. at 1292 (“Because under third-party analysis the contract creates a ‘duty’ not only to the 
promisee, the client, but also to the intended beneficiary, negligent nonperformance may give rise to 
a negligence action as well. Not every such contract will support either claim.”). 
294. Chang v. Lederman, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 758, 773 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (“Expanding the 
attorney’s duty of care to include actual beneficiaries who could have been, but were not, named in 
a revised estate plan, just like including third parties who could have been, but were not, named in a 
bequest, would expose attorneys to impossible duties and limitless liability because the interests of 
such potential beneficiaries are always in conflict . . . . Moreover, the results in such lawsuits, if 
allowed, would inevitably be speculative because the claim necessarily will not arise until the 
testator or settlor, the only person who can say what he or she intended or explain why a previously 
announced intention was subsequently modified, has died.”).  
295. Hale, 744 P.2d at 1293; see infra section IV.C.  
296. 524 So. 2d 464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
297. Id. at 466.  
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explained “[u]nder this exception, liability may be found on the part of 
an attorney if, due to the attorney’s professional negligence, 
testamentary intent as expressed in a will is frustrated, and the 
beneficiary’s legacy is lost or diminished as a direct result of that 
negligence.”298 
Likewise, the District of Columbia found that an attorney breached a 
duty of care to a nonclient upon omitting a residuary clause in Hamilton 
v. Needham.299 The court explained, “[a] lawyer who admits that he 
omitted from a will a residuary clause requested by the testator and 
thereby causes the residual estate to pass by intestate succession has 
facially demonstrated an obvious lack of care and skill.”300 The court 
affirmed the trial court’s malpractice finding because the attorney-
defendant did not offer any “meaningful facts to justify or excuse his 
failure and no real issue was presented as to causation.”301 
Under similar circumstances in Washington, the Trask factors would 
likely weigh in favor of a nonclient. The first factor, the extent to which 
the testator intended the transaction to benefit the plaintiff, favors the 
residuary beneficiary because the omitted provision intended to benefit 
her would cause significant harm. The second Trask factor, 
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, likely favors the nonclient if she 
can establish that the drafting attorney knew of the testator’s intention to 
leave a residuary benefit for her. The third and fourth Trask factors, the 
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury and the closeness of 
the connection between the attorney-defendant’s conduct and the injury, 
weigh in the nonclient’s favor because the omission would prevent the 
nonclient from receiving a benefit and cause injury to the nonclient from 
the attorney’s failure to adhere to the testator’s intentions. The fifth 
Trask factor, the policy of preventing future harm, favors the nonclient 
because omitting a residuary clause constitutes negligence.302 The sixth 
Trask factor, the extent to which the profession would be unduly 
burdened by a finding of liability, favors the nonclient-plaintiff. A 
finding of liability in the context of residuary clause omissions does not 
                                                     
298. Id. 
299. 519 A.2d 172, 175 (D.C. App. 1986) (holding that extrinsic evidence may be admitted to 
establish the testator’s intent and the attorney’s liability to intended beneficiaries after omitting a 
will’s residuary clause). 
300. Id. 
301. Id.  
302. Id. (“A lawyer who admits that he omitted from a will a residuary clause requested by the 
testator and thereby causes the residual estate to pass by intestate succession has facially 
demonstrated an obvious lack of care and skill.”). 
15 - Kelly.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/3/2017  3:05 PM 
1886 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1851 
 
unduly burden the profession because the mistake does not occur often, 
and when it does, the profession supports attorney accountability for the 
mistake.303 
Under the Trask balancing test, negligently omitting a residuary 
clause would likely open the door to a nonclient suit. In upholding this 
outcome, Washington would align itself with other states recognizing 
nonclients’ standing, even if the nonclient did not appear in the estate 
planning document.304 While this seems to create broad liability for an 
estate planning attorney, the nonclients still have a significant 
evidentiary challenge of establishing that the testator clearly intended for 
their benefit even though the document does not mention their name.305 
Attorney liability will not become sweeping because of this challenge. 
V. NONCLIENTS SHOULD EXHAUST THE REMEDIES 
PROVIDED UNDER WASHINGTON’S REFORMATION 
STATUTE BEFORE BRINGING A MALPRACTICE CLAIM 
To balance attorney liability and attorney accountability, this 
Comment proposes using Washington’s will and trust reformation 
statute as an exhaustion requirement before nonclients bring a 
malpractice action against an attorney. This solution may avoid unjust 
enrichment when individuals other than the intended beneficiaries 
receive a gift that the testator did not intend for them. It may also make 
the nonclient intended beneficiaries whole without the need for a 
malpractice action against the estate planning attorney. On occasions 
where the statute does not serve to make the intended beneficiaries 
whole, then further action through a malpractice claim might provide a 
remedy. 
                                                     
303. Mieras v. DeBona, 550 N.W.2d 202, 209 (Mich. 1996) (“Testators do not ordinarily ask that 
a will be drafted solely to bequeath specific property with the intent that the residue of the estate 
will be distributed as if they died intestate . . . it is not unusual, in contrast with the omission of a 
residuary clause, for a will to fail to exercise a power of appointment.”); see also Arnold, 524 So. 2d 
464, 467 (“[Attorney] clearly had a duty to read the will before allowing it to be turned over to his 
client”); Hamilton, 519 A.2d 172, 175 (“A lawyer who admits that he omitted from a will a 
residuary clause requested by the testator and thereby causes the residual estate to pass by intestate 
succession has facially demonstrated an obvious lack of care and skill. No expert need guide the 
factfinder here.”).  
304. See supra section III.B. 
305. Joan Teshima, Attorney’s Liability, to One Other Than Immediate Client, for Negligence in 
Connection with Legal Duties, in 61 A.L.R. 4th 615, § 2 (1988) (“In most cases, the courts have 
recognized a will-drafting attorney’s liability to an intended beneficiary whom the attorney 
negligently omitted when preparing the will, although proving such a cause of action when the 
attorney does not admit negligence may be complicated by the court’s exclusion of evidence 
showing that the testator’s intention was different from that disclosed in the will.”). 
15 - Kelly.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/3/2017  3:05 PM 
2016] PUT PRIVITY IN THE PAST 1887 
 
A. Washington’s Reformation Statute Provides a Progressive Solution 
for Frustrated Intended Beneficiaries When the Estate Planning 
Document Has a Clear Mistake 
Beyond the Trask balancing test, Washington’s reformation statute, 
RCW 11.96A.125,306 allows courts and intended beneficiaries to remedy 
the problem presented by a nonclient intended beneficiary’s cause of 
action.307 The statute provides: 
The terms of a will or trust, even if ambiguous, may be reformed 
by judicial proceedings . . . to conform the terms to the intention 
of the testator or trustor if it is proved by clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence that both the intent of the testator or trustor 
and the terms of the will or trust were affected by a mistake of 
fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.308 
Under common law, courts could not modify wills or trusts.309 
Washington’s adoption of this statue defies common law and allows for 
the modification of both wills and trusts either by court order or the 
parties’ binding nonjudical agreement.310 The departure from common 
law and implementation of this statute coincides with the Restatement 
(Third) of Property, the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), and the Uniform 
Trust Code (UTC).311 Like Washington, the Restatement, the UPC, and 
                                                     
306. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.125 (2016).  
307. Id. 
308. Id. 
309. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1, cmt. c 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“Until recently, courts have not allowed reformation of wills. The denial of 
a reformation remedy for wills was predicated on observance of the Statute of Wills, which requires 
that wills be executed in accordance with certain formalities. . . . modern authority is moving away 
from insistence on strict compliance with the statutory formalities . . . . Recent cases [and statutes] 
have begun to recognize that wills can be reformed.”).  
310. See Karen E. Boxx & Katie S. Groblewski, Washington Trust Laws’ Extreme Makeover: 
Blending with the Uniform Trust Code and Taking Reform Further with Innovations in Notice, 
Suits, and Representation, 88 WASH. L. REV. 813, 890–91 (2013). 
311. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2003) (“A donative document, though unambiguous, may be reformed to conform the 
text to the donor’s intention if it is established by clear and convincing evidence (1) that a mistake 
of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement, affected specific terms of the document; and 
(2) what the donor’s intention was. In determining whether these elements have been established by 
clear and convincing evidence, direct evidence of intention contradicting the plain meaning of the 
text as well as other evidence of intention may be considered.”); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2010) (“The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform 
the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the 
settlor’s intention was and that the terms [of the trust] were affected by a mistake of fact or law, 
whether in expression or inducement.”); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-805 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N amended 
2010) (“The court may reform the terms of a governing instrument, even if unambiguous, to 
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the UTC, other states also allow for the reformation of wills and 
trusts.312 
The Washington State Legislature first enacted the will and trust 
reformation statute in 2011. Then, in 2013, it amended the provision 
while amending several other provisions to reform the state’s trust 
laws.313 Support for the bill came largely from the state’s desire to keep 
trusts in Washington by making the governing laws attractive. The bill 
also “makes a lot of other housekeeping changes to streamline the 
process and make trust administration and resolution of disputes more 
efficient and less costly.”314 The trust and will reformation provision is 
one such housekeeping element. 
When utilized, the provision allows for the efficient and cheap 
resolution of trust and will disputes without malpractice litigation. 
Petitioners commence “judicial proceedings” under RCW 11.96A as 
“new action[s].”315 The actions are “special proceeding[s] under the civil 
rules of court” governed by the procedural provisions of the chapter.316 
Filing a petition in the superior court with jurisdiction commences a 
judicial proceeding.317 The clear, cogent, and convincing evidence 
standard limits courts’ reformation power to those cases where a mistake 
of fact or law exists and inhibits the intent of a testator or trustor.318 The 
statute continues to allow will or trust reformation without a finding of 
                                                     
conform the terms to the transferor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence what 
the transferor’s intention was and that the terms of the governing instrument were affected by a 
mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”).  
312. See In re Estate of Duke, 352 P.3d 863, 879 (Cal. 2015) (California was “persuaded that 
authorizing the reformation of wills . . . serves the paramount purpose of the law governing wills 
without compromising the policies underlying the statutory scheme and the common law rules. If a 
mistake in expression and the testator’s actual and specific intent at the time the will was drafted are 
established by clear and convincing evidence, no policy underlying the statute of wills supports a 
rule that would ignore the testator’s intent and unjustly enrich those who would inherit as a result of 
a mistake.”); Erickson v. Erickson, 716 A.2d 92, 98 (Conn. 1998) (holding that extrinsic evidence 
may be admitted to prove the testator’s intent and an error may be corrected if clear and convincing 
evidence shows the testator’s intent was frustrated by the error); Engle v. Siegel, 377 A.2d 892, 
893–85 (N.J. 1977); In re Herceg, 747 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903–05 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2002).  
313. H. 63-5344, Reg. Sess., at 5 (Wash. 2013) (House bill report) (“This bill levels the playing 
field with other states to encourage people to keep their trusts in Washington.”); S. 63-5344, Reg. 
Sess. (Wash. 2013) (Senate bill report).  
314. H. 63-5344, Reg. Sess., at 5 (Wash. 2013) (House bill report); S. 63-5344, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 
2013) (Senate bill report). 
315. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.090 (2016).  
316. Id.  
317. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.100 (2016). 
318. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.125 (2016). 
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clear, cogent, and convincing evidence through TEDRA agreements 
under RCW 11.96A.220.319 
By applying this statute, courts can lessen the exposure of an 
attorney’s estate planning malpractice liability while still remedying the 
harm to intended beneficiaries. A court may award a nonclient attorneys’ 
fees under RCW 11.96A.150 to hold attorneys accountable for their 
mistake or negligence in estate planning. The statute provides: 
(1) Either the superior court or any court on an appeal may, in 
its discretion, order costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, 
to be awarded to any party: 
(a) From any party to the proceedings; 
(b) from the assets of the estate or trust involved in the 
proceedings; or 
(c) from any nonprobate asset that is the subject of the 
proceedings. The court may order the costs, including 
reasonable attorneys’ fees, to be paid in such amount and in such 
manner as the court determines to be equitable. In exercising its 
discretion under this section, the court may consider any and all 
factors that it deems to be relevant and appropriate, which 
factors may but need not include whether the litigation benefits 
the estate or trust involved.320 
This Comment urges Washington courts to require nonclient intended 
beneficiaries to exhaust RCW 11.96A.125 before bringing a malpractice 
cause of action. While the Trask balancing test has a clear result in cases 
where the prompt execution of a will or trust is at issue, the Trask 
balancing test does not have a clear result in other fact patterns. In order 
to reduce the harm of litigation and limit malpractice liability while still 
holding estate planning attorneys accountable, courts should impose 
RCW 11.96A.125 whenever possible and may impose attorneys’ fees 
under RCW 11.96A.150 as punishment if necessary. 
                                                     
319. WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, Comments to 2012 Title 11 Revisions, http://www.wsba.org/ 
Legal-Community/LegislativeAffairs/~/media/Files/Legal%20Community/Legislative%20Affairs/ 
2013/Trust%20Act.ashx [https://perma.cc/8BC8-MBCK] (“This section is modified to clarify that 
the evidentiary standard contained in this section only applies to reformations by judicial procedure. 
It is long standing law in Washington that reformations may be made by agreement under RCW 
11.96A.220 without application of the evidentiary standard.”).  
320. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.150 (2016).  
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B. Washington Plaintiffs Should Exhaust the Reformation Statute 
Before Bringing Legal Malpractice Actions Like Plaintiffs Exhaust 
Probate Proceedings Before Bringing Tortious Interference with 
Inheritance Claims in Other States 
Several other jurisdictions hold that tortious interference with an 
expected inheritance claims must be exhausted in probate proceedings 
before plaintiffs may bring such causes of action.321 This Comment 
proposes that a similar exhaustion requirement should apply in 
Washington before a nonclient brings a legal malpractice cause of 
action. 
While the state legislature could enact an exhaustion requirement, 
courts in other states have adopted a similar requirement through 
common law. Florida holds that “if adequate relief is available in a 
probate proceeding, then that remedy must be exhausted before a 
tortious interference claim may be pursued.”322 In that case, the plaintiff 
could have brought an undue influence claim before a probate court and 
had the will declared invalid, thereby inheriting intestate because she 
was the only heir. The Court did not allow a subsequent tort action to 
bring the undue influence claim again.323 Similarly, a New Jersey 
appellate court noted that it was “in accord with a multitude of courts” 
when it held “that a claim for tortious interference with an anticipated 
inheritance is unavailable when an adequate probate remedy exists.”324 
Likewise, Nebraska, which does not recognize claims of tortious 
interference with an expected inheritance, held that adopting that cause 
of action was unnecessary because it “would duplicate theories of 
recovery available to [the plaintiff].”325 The Court found that the 
remedies available in probate proceedings were adequate where “the 
action in the probate court would be to impose a constructive trust over 
the proceeds of the sale of real estate, as compared to an action for 
damages based upon the tort.”326 
                                                     
321. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); Litherland v. Jurgens, 869 
N.W.2d 92, 97 (Neb. 2015); Garruto v. Cannici, 936 A.2d 1015, 1022 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2007).  
322. DeWitt, 408 So. 2d at 218 (citing Benedict v. Smith, 376 A.2d 774 (Conn. 1977)). 
323. Id.  
324. Garruto, 936 A.2d at 1022 (citing cases from New Mexico, Arkansas, Maryland, Montana, 
Indiana, Illinois, Florida, Connecticut, North Carolina, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Kansas).  
325. Litherland v. Jurgens, 869 N.W.2d 92, 97 (Neb. 2015).  
326. Id. 
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As noted above, Washington has not faced an appropriate fact pattern 
to clarify the Trask balancing test, let alone establish an exhaustion 
requirement. However, the facts of a recent California case demonstrate 
the practicality of such an exhaustion requirement. In Paul v. Patton,327 a 
testator intended to give “Other Assets—Personal Property” to his 
children from his first marriage in a trust.328 However, the attorney 
drafted the trust agreement to give the residue to the broad category: the 
client’s “beneficiaries.”329 The “beneficiaries” group included both the 
testator’s adult children and his second spouse, thereby giving the 
second spouse a larger portion of the estate than the testator intended and 
decreasing the amount intended for his children.330 The children first 
filed a petition to modify the trust agreement and obtained a letter from 
the drafting attorney who admitted that the trust did not reflect the 
testator’s intentions.331 The modification action resulted in a settlement, 
in which the second wife still received more than the testator intended to 
give her.332 
Following the settlement, the children proceeded with a professional 
negligence claim against the drafting attorney, which the trial court 
dismissed.333 The court of appeals reversed the dismissal, holding that 
the attorney may have owed a duty of care to the children because the 
testator clearly intended them to benefit from his estate.334 
Although the court did not require the testator’s children to reform the 
will before bringing a cause of action against the attorney, they 
attempted to do so.335 The reformation action did not make the plaintiffs 
whole because it resulted in a settlement that unjustly enriched the 
second spouse.336 If the children had refused to settle, the reformation 
action may have made them whole because the attorney’s letter clearly 
evidenced the testator’s intentions and admitted a drafting error.337 
Similarly, the Hale v. Groce plaintiffs brought an action to reform the 
                                                     
327. 185 Cal. Rptr. 3d 830 (2015). 
328. Id. at 833.  
329. Id. 
330. Id. 
331. Id. at 833–34.  
332. Id. at 834. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. at 839. 
335. Id. at 833–34. 
336. Id. 
337. Id.  
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will before bringing an action against the estate planning attorney.338 
Like the Paul plaintiffs, the reformation action failed to make the Hale 
plaintiffs whole. 
If a Washington court faced facts similar to Paul v. Putton and 
required the intended beneficiaries to first exhaust their remedies 
through the reformation statute, then fair results would likely follow. 
The nonclient-plaintiffs could potentially receive the portion of their 
father’s estate due to them, prevent the second spouse’s unjust 
enrichment, avoid litigation against the drafting attorney, yet still hold 
the attorney accountable by imposing an attorneys’ fees obligation. 
Although the reformation exhaustion requirement adds an extra hurdle 
for beneficiaries, it would still provide a cause of action when the 
beneficiaries have a strong claim and cannot reach a reformation 
remedy. Like the Hale v. Groce plaintiff, if the reformation statute 
proved ineffective because the will or trust does not expressly provide a 
gift to the beneficiaries, then a Washington nonclient-plaintiff could still 
bring a cause of action against an attorney for a court to analyze under 
the Trask balancing test.339 
CONCLUSION 
The Washington State Supreme Court should give clear guidance to 
lower courts regarding the administration of the Trask balancing test. 
Thus far, the Trask balancing test has not weighed in favor of nonclient 
intended beneficiaries, but only a limited number of fact patterns have 
come before Washington courts.340 Under the right circumstances, the 
Trask balancing test may come out in favor of the nonclient rather than 
the attorney. Washington may allow a nonclient a cause of action against 
the drafting attorney if presented with facts concerning the negligent 
omission of a residuary clause or an estate planning document that 
frustrates the testator’s intentions on its face. 
Nonclient intended beneficiaries should use Washington’s will and 
trust reformation statute, RCW 11.96A.125, to alleviate their harm 
before bringing a legal malpractice action against the attorney. Like 
states that require exhaustion in probate proceedings before plaintiffs 
                                                     
338. Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1293 (Or. 1987) (Hale plaintiff brought a reformation action 
to reform the will and related trust document that failed to name him because the drafting attorney 
negligently omitted the testator’s intended gift for the plaintiff); see supra section IV.B.  
339. Id. at 1293.  
340. See Linth v. Gay, 190 Wash. App. 331, 360 P.3d 844 (2015); Parks v. Fink, 173 Wash. App. 
366, 293 P.3d 1275 (2013); WASH. STATE SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra 
note 36. 
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may bring tortious interference with inheritance claims, Washington 
courts should require exhaustion by reformation before nonclient-
plaintiffs may bring malpractice claims. Using this statute as an 
exhaustion requirement and requiring the attorney at fault to pay the 
intended beneficiaries’ attorneys’ fees holds attorneys accountable for 
estate planning work and deters negligent drafting and execution of 
estate planning documents. It also limits frivolous litigation by frustrated 
intended beneficiaries, and allows courts to make harmed intended 
beneficiaries whole outside of a malpractice lawsuit. 
 
